The nature of relations and the metaphysical dilemma in Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus. by Thompson, Lora Cindy.
~. ;.
The Nature of Relations and the Metaphysical





Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts
in the School of Human and Social Studies at the University ofNatal,
Pietermaritzburg
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with an analysis ofLudwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus that centers around the dilemma in which Wittgenstein finds himself in expressing
the belief that the propositions of his work, while they are nonsensical according to their own
standards, remain informative. The contention is that whether the text is successful in upholding
Wittgenstein's claim relies deeply on the account that it gives of relations, in particular the
pictorial relation and the relations that pertain amongst objects in states of affairs. It will be
argued that the Tractatus sets itself the requirement that ifits propositions are to be nonsensical
yet informative, then they must display the general form of a proposition that can have 'sense.'
In turn, if any proposition is to be able to have 'sense,' then the pictorial relation must serve a
dual purpose in holding the situation represented in the sense of a proposition distinct from the
reality it depicts, while acting as a means of comparison such that the truth or falsity of a
proposition can be determined. It will then be argued that if the pictorial relation is to be able to
function in this way, then propositions must be able to signify exactly which relations pertain in
the situation depicted by its sense. In conclusion a case will be made that the Tractatus is unable
to meet the demands that it places on itself, for the work does not give an account by which
elementary propositions, to which all propositions are analyzable, can signify the specific
relations which pertain in the states of affairs they represent.
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This thesis is concerned with an analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus that centers around the dilemma in which Wittgenstein finds himself in expressing
the belief that the propositions of his work, while they are nonsensical according to their own
standards, remain informative. The contention is that whether the text is successful in upholding
Wittgenstein's claim relies deeply on the account that it gives of relations, in particular the
pictorial relation and the relations that pertain amongst objects in states of affairs. It will be
argued that the Tractatus sets itselfthe requirement that if its propositions are to be nonsensical
yet informative, then they must display the general form of a proposition that can have 'sense.'
In turn, if any proposition is to be able to have 'sense,' then the pictorial relation must serve a
dual purpose in holding the situation represented in the sense of a proposition distinct from the
reality it depicts, while acting as a means of comparison such that the truth or falsity of a
proposition can be determined. It will then be argued that if the pictorial relation is to be able to
function in this way, then propositions must be able to signify exactly which relations pertain in
the situation depicted by its sense. In conclusion a case will be made that the Tractatus is unable
to meet the demands that it places on itself, for the work does not give an account by which
elementary propositions, to which all propositions are analyzable, can signify the specific
relations which pertain in the states of affairs they represent.
It is my hope that this thesis will accomplish two goals. The first is to outline the demands that
the Tractatus places on itself, and subsequently to show how it does not answer to these demands.
The second objective is to offer a unique and unified reading of the text. It must be noted that
this analysis is concerned solely with the text as it appears in the Tractatus, this fact accounting
for the apparent paucity of reference to the work of other authors on the subject.
The body of this thesis is divided into three main parts to address the first aim of this thesis. Part
one, comprised of chapters one, two and three is concerned with demonstrating that the pictorial
relation plays a central role in the Tractatus in allowing for the propositions contained within the
work to remain informative, while they are nonsensical according to their own standards. To this
end, chapter one will introduce, in context, Wittgenstein's notions of picturing and of ,sense' as
that which a picture depicts. Chapter two will then introduce the pictorial relation, indicating that
it plays an integral role in defining a picture as that which can represent only a possibility in
logical space, such that all pictures have the possibility of representing falsely. Chapter three will
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characterize 'nonsense,' while presenting Wittgenstein's views on his own propositions as
nonsensical, though of the same general form as sensical propositions. The purpose of part two
of this thesis, consisting of chapters four and five, is to draw attention to the requirements that
must be met by the Tractatus if the pictorial relation is to act as a means of comparison between a
proposition and reality, such that the truth or falsity of that proposition is determinable. Chapter
four will discuss the requirement for the determinacy of 'sense', and chapter five the demand that
a proposition represent no more than a single sense. Chapter five will also present the conditions
under which its demand can be met, namely that a proposition must signify exactly which
relations pertain in the situation it represents through its sense. Finally, part three, chapters six
and seven, will address the implications that the demand made in chapter five has for the
Tractatus. Chapter six will argue that the work is unable to answer to this demand as a result of
its inability to provide an explanation of how the specific relations pertaining in a state of affairs
can be signified in an elementary proposition. Chapter seven will indicate that the demand made
in chapter five renders elementary propositions to be non-independent, thereby disallowing that
logical necessity can be displayed in the way that the tractarian notion of independent elementary
propositions allowed.
With regard to the second objective of this thesis, chapters five and seven will play the most
significant role. Chapter five will present a unique reading of logical multiplicity, which I feel
allows for a more unified reading of the text, by disassociating the conception of logical
multiplicity from the debate over the status of objects. Chapter seven concludes that this unique
reading calls for a different mode of description of the world than the one given by Wittgenstein
to be used in the Tractatus. It will be revealed that it is both possible and useful, ifnot necessary,
given the demands the text places on itself, to describe the world in terms of degree.
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It will be fruitful, before my analysis ofthe text begins, to discuss briefly to what end
Wittgenstein felt that his work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus comes. The reader of this
work can so easily become embroiled in the details ofthe various propositions set out, that it is
important to keep always in mind what, according to Wittgenstein, the book is supposed to
achieve. He stated exactly what he felt to be the purpose of the Tractatus in the preface.
... the aim of this book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather-not to thought, but to the expression
of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the
limit thinkable (ie: we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only
be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be
Inon-sense.
It appears that the key aim ofthe Tractatus is to make known that there is a limit between 'sense'
and 'nonsense' in language. An assessment of this limit will guide the exposition of
Wittgenstein's thoughts presented in the first part of this thesis. Chapter one will characterize this
limit which, in being placed in language as opposed to thought is a perceptible boundary to what
can be said in any language. The second chapter will handle the tractarian answer to the problem
of how there can be a limit to language that is perceptible and yet cannot be characterized in any
language. The final chapter of part one will discuss that which lay on the other side ofthe
boundary to what can be said, which includes the propositions put forth in the Tractatus itself.
I hope to demonstrate in the first part of this thesis that, if, as Wittgenstein would like, the
propositions of the Tractatus are to remain informative while they are nonsensical by their own
standards, then the pictorial relation plays a crucial role.
I See Wittgenstein (1961) page 3.
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Chapter 1
The first chapter of this section is concerned with a close investigation of Wittgenstein's intention
in stating, as he does in the preface, that a limit must be drawn, not to thought, but rather to
language, the expression of thought. It will explore Wittgenstein's notions ofthoughts and
language, or the expression of thoughts. First it will be determined how thoughts and the
expression of thoughts are considered distinct, while also establishing that the expression of
thought is, in the Tractatus, in some language. Next, Wittgenstein's concept of thoughts as
logical pictures will be investigated, establishing how and why pictures represent the world.
Here will be presented Wittgenstein's conception of the world, and therefore, pictures of the
world, as logical. Subsequently, Wittgenstein's notion of 'sense' will be explored as that which
thoughts and pictures represent. Lastly, it will be asserted that the significance of the limit
between 'sense' and 'nonsense' being placed in language rather than in thoughts is that the limit
becomes perceptible to the senses and acts as a boundary to what can be said in any language.
1.1 The thought-language distinction
This section is concerned with the distinction made in the Tractatus between thought and the
expression of thought. It will show that the expression of thought is in language, and can take
many forms, each valid so long as it is translatable into all other possible forms.
As is portrayed in the above passage taken from the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein
seemed to draw a distinction between thoughts and the expression thereof, in saying that there is a
limit not to thoughts, but rather to the expression of thoughts. The following sentence states that
the limit must, therefore, be in language, thereby indicating that language is the means of the
expression of thought. That Wittgenstein intended this understanding of the relation of thought to
language is confirmed by the proposition, found later in the Tractatus, 3.1.
3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.
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Propositions are commonly conceived of as spoken or written statements in language. Thus, it
seems that 3.1 can be understood to say that it is in language that thoughts can be expressed in a
perceivable manner. However, Wittgenstein's notion of language, as the expression of thought,
requires a closer investigation. In representing a thought, it is possible to use more routes than
simply speech or writing. It would seem that a drawing would also qualify as an expression of a
thought, and therefore, as a proposition. This is also in accordance with the views of the
Tractatus, as 4.01 indicates, that for definition as such, a proposition must simply picture reality
in some perceptible fashion.
4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.
While it does not seem apparent that there must be a relation between a drawing and spoken or
written language, Wittgenstein does, as a matter offact, indicate that there is, and must be, a
direct relation. To begin with, it is clearly pointed out that there are often several means of
representing the same thing. Take, for example, the different modes of musical representation
that Wittgenstein discusses in the following proposition.
4.0141 There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the
score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the
gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what
constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such
entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony
into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the
language of gramophone records.
What this proposition suggests is that the pattern of bumps and dips in the groove of the
gramophone record represents the same piece of music as the notes written on paper in the score.
Further, one can potentially always translate from one mode of representation to the other; from
the score to the bumps and dips of the gramophone record, from each of these to the music heard
when the symphony is played, and vice versa. What is not clearly asserted, is that one must be
able to translate between these modes of representation. What is more, one must be able to
translate between one mode of representation and any other one. Just as one must be able to write
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the score from the symphony as it is played, one must be able to write the symphony out in words
from the score, the notes written in their word form. This does not seem to be a misinterpretation
of this proposition, as Wittgenstein stated the necessity for translatability earlier in the Tractatus.
3.343 Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another. Any correct sign-
language must be translatable into any other in accordance with such rules: it is this that
they all have in common.
While the concept of definition is not at present important, what is important to understand from
this proposition is that rules exist for translation between modes of representation. More
importantly, these rules exist necessarily. Any correct sign-language, in order to exist as a mode
of representation must be translatable, these rules of translation must apply to it. This serves to
show, in reference to the previous discussion, that there is a necessary relation between a drawn
picture and that same picture described in words. Each must be translatable into the other. In this
light, language as the expression of thought can take many forms, each valid so long as it is
translatable into all other possible forms. Thus, in which form one conceives ofthe expression of
thought does not influence the relation between thought and language, that language is a
perceptible expression of thought.
1.2 Thoughts as logical pictures of the world
The previous section revealed that, for the purpose of the Tractatus, language can take many
forms in acting as the perceptible expression of thoughts. This section will explain that it is
logical pictures which are thoughts, and which can come to be expressed in a perceptible fashion
in language. The ensuing discussion will show that these pictures are logical because they are
representations ofthe world, which Wittgenstein conceives of as necessarily logical, and share in
this form.
Wittgenstein makes clear in the proposition 3 of the Tractatus that it is a property of logical
pictures to exist as thoughts.
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3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
Because logical pictures have the property of being thoughts, it is these logical pictures
that can come to be expressed in language. A bit of enlightenment is necessary, then, as
to the nature of a logical picture. Wittgenstein addressed the issue of these logical
pictures in the following.
2.19 Logical pictures can depict the world.
This proposition introduces the very important notion in the Tractatus, that there is a close
relation between logic and the world. It is a notion which must be explored. The proposition
2.19 seems to assert that it is the privileged status of logical pictures to be able to represent the
world. If this is the case, one might say that the world must, therefore, also be logical. Further, it
would seem that the world is necessarily logical, because otherwise, the possibility might exist
that illogical pictures could also represent the world. Wittgenstein denies the possibility that
illogical pictures exist, for he states that every picture must be logical.
2.182 Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture is, for
example, a spatial one.)
It seems that being logical is a prerequisite for something to be a picture. 2.182 points out that
there can be pictures of other forms, for example of spatial, and perhaps also temporal form.
Both of these other forms, and in fact, any other imaginable forms, are also forms of the world.
As each of these other forms of pictures is also logical, it seems that the world is, in
Wittgenstein's eyes, necessarily logical. This idea is confirmed by Wittgenstein when he states:
6.13 Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental.
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It is in this way that the world can be said to be necessarily logical; logic is a reflection ofthe
world, it is what we can understand of the world. Understanding the world means understanding
the logic of the world. It is not the case that without logic one would not comprehend the world,
rather without the world, it would not be possible to understand logic. This will make itself more
clear only in later discussion. For now, it will be enough to see where in the world this logic lies.
It must now be asked what is it ofthe world that is reflected in logic. Proposition 6.3 is revealing
on this matter.
6.3 The exploration of logic means the exploration of everything that is subject to law. And
outside logic everything is accidental.
What is reflected of the world is that it is subject to laws. This would have to mean that the
world, at least in some way, is non-accidental. This is an idea which will occur again in the
evaluation of the Tractatus. A further explanation will present itself in the discussion of objects,
to come later. The conception of the world as logical is highly important to the Tractatus,
especially so for how one is to understand pictures in the context of this work. It has already been
stated that pictures are necessarily logical. The view of logic as a reflection of the world that has
been given would require, then, that pictures must be of the world. The idea that the world is the
essential subject matter of pictures is revealed in proposition 2.12.
2.12 A picture is a model of reality.
While it seems intuitive that reality, as it is referred to here, and the world are equivalent, this
may not be the understanding that Wittgenstein intended. The most useful proposition to refer to
in order to work out the similarity or dissimilarity between reality and the world is 2.063.
2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world.
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Reality, it appears, amounts to the world. The world is, as this proposition asserts, reality in its
entirety. One might say, then, that reality consists, somehow, of smaller portions of the world,
not the world as a whole. It is obvious that reality and the world are closely similar, enough so
that one can consider the Tractatus proposition 2.12 to say that a picture is a model ofthe world.
However, Wittgenstein clearly draws a distinction between reality and the world. They are not
equivalent. Why this is, one will only be able to say after a broader study of the Tractatus. One
can, at this point, come away with the understanding that a picture is a model of a portion of the
world.
The question now stands as to why a picture can represent reality. Just as there are innumerable
different sign-languages, there must also be different types of pictures. Indeed, it has already
been noted that there can be spatial and possibly also temporal pictures. Different sign-
languages, it has been determined, are considered correct, and thereby able to represent reality, if
they are translatable into any other correct sign-language. It must be asked what the requirements
are such that different types of pictures can represent reality. First, however, it must be made
explicit what up to now has only been implied about pictures. Namely,
2.173 A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its
representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or
incorrectly.
Pictures are not a part of the portion of the world that they picture. Pictures are independent and
distinct from what they picture, reality or a portion of the world. A picture and that which it
pictures must exist separately of one another. Underlying this assertion is the view that reality
exists independent of its viewer. Further, the sum total of reality, the world, exists independent of
any viewer. It is only in this way that one is able to depict the world correctly or incorrectly. If
reality were dependent upon its observer, then it would seem impossible to depict this reality
incorrectly. In the case that the viewer and the reality that he sees are not independent of one
another, the viewer cannot be wrong in his depiction of reality, for the reality does not exist
except relative to his perception of it.
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Given that the world exists separately from any observer, it must be determined what allows any
type of picture to represent this independent reality. Wittgenstein hints at the answer in 2.161.
2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable one to be a
picture of the other at all.
It has already been suggested that the world, and, therefore, the pictures that represent it are
logical by nature. It is exactly this logical nature that must be identical between a picture and that
portion of the world that it pictures. The following proposition describes just this.
2.18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able
to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of
reality.
One must note in this proposition that, while indicating that what is identical in pictures and what
is pictured is that they are both logical, this is done by reference to a form, logical form. Clearly
the concept of a form is significant to Wittgenstein and, therefore, the Tractatus. In order to see
the significance that form has for this work, one must see how it is defined. Wittgenstein defines
form as follows.
2.033 Form is the possibility of structure.
According to this statement, form is not a definite, or specific structure, but rather the possibility
of having a structure. This suggests that there must be no strict formation that either a picture or
the pictured reality must take on in order for the former to represent the latter. It seems that each
must rather be able to conform to the same structure. This seems to mirror the idea, discussed
previously, that there is no specific character that a sign-language must take in order to be correct;
it must simply contain the possibility of being translated into any other sign-language. To better
understand what this logical form, or the possibility of logical structure is, one might reword the
proposition 6.3, replacing exploration with form. The form of logic means the form of everything
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that is subject to law. In other words, if something does not have the possibility of being
governed by a law, it cannot be logical. In the context of picturing, if something does not have
the possibility of being subject to law, it does not have the possibility of being able to represent
that which is subject to law, the world. The concept of a form will be of great importance to the
Tractatus, and will be discussed and further explained at a later point. Wittgenstein exemplifies
the idea that reality and a picture thereof must be logical, must be able to be subject to laws, in the
following proposition.
3.032 It is as impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts logic' as it is in
geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to
give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.
In light of the Tractatus, the pictures which find expression in language are the logical pictures of
thoughts. Because these pictures share the form of the world, which Wittgenstein sees as logical,
the pictures must also be logical. Further, in sharing the logical form ofthe world, pictures are
able to represent reality from a position outside of that portion of the world that they picture. It
has been explained what, in terms of the Tractatus, is required of a picture, both in thought and in
language, namely, to be logical by sharing in the form of the world.
1.3 'Sense' as that which a picture depicts
The previous section determined that a picture can represent a portion of reality, defined as
something logical or subject to law. However, upon further inspection of the Tractatus, it can be
seen that this is not a sufficient description of exactly what a picture depicts. Wittgenstein
introduces the notion of 'sense' as that which a picture represents. This section is concerned with
characterizing this notion of 'sense' as the presentation of a situation which might pertain in the
world, and which is compared to the world in order to determine the truth or falsity of the
proposition containing it.
Clearly stated in proposition 2.221 is Wittgenstein's notion ofa picture as depicting a sense.
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2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.
It will only be through investigation of the various occurrences of the concept 'sense' in the
Tractatus that one can grasp its meaning. On reading 2.221 as the first introduction ofthe notion
of 'sense', one might be inclined to say that the sense of a picture is the portion of the world to
which it refers. This is, however, a misleading reading. Consider the following proposition.
2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.
If one is to consider the portion of the world which is represented in a picture as the sense of that
picture, this proposition is incoherent, for the sense would be the reality. The possibility of
disagreement does not exist. Similarly, understanding 'sense' as that to which a picture
corresponds in reality is not consistent with the presentation of 'sense' in 4.0621.
4.0621 But it is important that the signs 'p' and '~p' can say the same thing. For it shows that
nothing in reality corresponds to the sign '-'. The occurrence of negation in a proposition
is not enough to characterize its sense (--p=p). The propositions 'p' and '-p' have opposite
sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality.
As indicated in this proposition, 'p' and '-p' correspond to the same reality, the same portion of
the world, namely the situation 'p'. However, 'p' and '-p' have opposite 'sense,' so 'sense'
cannot be that to which a picture corresponds. It is seen through this that Wittgenstein
acknowledges that a distinction exists between the concept of 'sense' and that of 'reference.' This
is indisputably an echo of the distinction that was previously presented by Frege in his work 'On
Sense and Meaning' (1892). The view expressed therein identifies 'sense' as that which contains
a cognitive mode ofpresentation, which functions as the significance of what is expressed. A
'reference', on the other hand is that to which the content corresponds when the expression is
used.
15
That Wittgenstein maintains a 'sense'-'reference' distinction is shown in propositions such as
3.114, which seems to indicate that while names have a reference, only propositions have
'sense. ,2
3.144 Situations can be described but not given names. (Names are like points; propositions like
arrows - they have sense.)
Names, it seems, can designate specific points in reality, such as objects. Propositions, however,
in presenting situations, as is indicated that they do by this statement, cannot represent simple
points. Propositions, in describing situations, must present something beyond a series of points.
One might be inclined to say that the sense of a proposition is the way that these points are
presented. This would be very much in line with the notion of 'sense' presented by Frege, that
'sense' is a mode of presentation which determines the significance of that which is presented.
It has been pointed out by Peter Carruthers that this Fregean concept of 'sense,' however, does
not coincide with the use ofthe word in the Tractatui. He indicates several instances ofthis, and
offers an alternative and cogent interpretation of 'sense' which will be adopted for the purposes
of this thesis.
The interpretation of the proposition 3.144, presented above, given by Carruthers is that names
can be directed simply at one point, the object which bears the name, while propositions can point
in two directions, to the circumstances under which they are true and the circumstances under
which they are false. In presenting a sense, a proposition is presenting some situation which can
be determined to be true or false in comparison to the world. In this way, he believes, 'sense' is
best understood as 'truth-condition.4,
2 The notion that names have reference and not sense is in opposition to the theory presented by Frege, that
names and propositions can equally have both sense and reference. See 'On Sense and Meaning' (1892) in
Geach (1952) pages 56-78.
3 Carruthers recognizes that 'sense' in the Tractatus does not have the cognitive implications of Frege's
definition. He uses the example of the tractarian proposition 2.221 which, in light of Frege's notion of
'sense' as a mode of presentation, would have had to read that 'sense' is the way a picture represents, as
opposed to the tractarian assertion that 'sense' is what it represents. See Carruthers (1989) page 24.
4 Peter Carruthers is concerned with the translation from the original German of the words 'Sinn' and
'Bedeutung,' which are generally translated as 'sense' and 'reference' or 'meaning.' He offers alternative
translations, namely 'truth-condition' and 'semantic content.' See Carruthers (1989) pages 21-32 and
Carruthers (1990) pages 1-4.
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In this light, 'sense' is a presentation of the situation which will render the proposition true, if the
situation to which it corresponds in the world pertains. This reading of 'sense' fits smoothly with
the proposition 2.222 presented above, which states that the truth or falsity of a proposition lies in
the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality. One can also see how 'sense,' for
Wittgenstein must differ from 'reference'. 'Sense' is not the portion of the world to which a
proposition corresponds. Rather, it is the presentation of a situation which might pertain in the
world, and which is compared to the world in order to determine the truth or falsity ofthe
proposition containing it.
1.4 The 'sense'-'nonsense' limit in language
This section will be concerned with demonstrating that the limit purported in the Tractatus,
between 'sense' and 'nonsense' in language is a limit to what can be said in any language.
Further, it will be argued that Wittgenstein must have felt that this limit is one that can be
perceived by the senses and yet not be stated. This will serve as an introduction to the Doctrine
of Showing, whereby there are things that can be shown, which cannot be said.
To return to the concept of thought, with which this chapter began, one now has sufficient
understanding to comprehend Wittgenstein's meaning when he presents his most explicit
definition of thought.
4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
In asserting that a thought is a proposition, Wittgenstein is stating that a thought is a picture of
reality, or a portion of the world, which necessarily shares the logical form of the world. Further,
the thought presents a sense, a situation which might pertain in the world, which when compared
to the reality it depicts, will determine whether the thought cum proposition is true or false. This
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thought, in being a proposition, has the possibility of being expressed in some form of language,
and thereby of being perceived by the senses.
The conception of propositions as potentially perceptible is useful in understanding
Wittgenstein's intention in stating, as he does in the preface, that a limit must be drawn, not to
thought, but rather to language, the expression of thought. The requirement that a limit be drawn
not to thought, but to the expression of thought is the requirement that this limit be perceptible. It
seems that only in being perceptible, can the existence of a limit have significance. In making it
the aim of the only book to be published in his lifetime, Wittgenstein surely felt the demarcation
of this limit to be important.
It has not, however, been made clear to what this limit is a boundary. Wittgenstein hints in the
preface that the limit is a boundary to 'sense,' by stating that what is on the other side of the limit
is 'nonsense.' It must be explored what the significance of a limit betweens 'sense' and
'nonsense' in language might be. It has already been seen, and is confirmed by the proposition
4.064 that 'sense' is inherent to propositions.
4.064 Every proposition must already have a sense: it cannot be given a sense by affirmation.
Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed. And the same applies to negation, etc.
Propositions, according to this statement, have a sense necessarily. This is telling about the
significance of a limit to 'sense.' For a limit to 'sense' must also be a limit to propositions and
the thoughts that the propositions express. As it has been asserted, in terms of the Tractatus, that
a proposition has the possibility of being perceived through some form of language, a limit to
propositions is a limit to language. The importance of a boundary between 'sense' and
'nonsense' must be that it acts as a limit to what can be said in any language. One is not misled
in this belief, for Wittgenstein states clearly in the Tractatus what he feels to be the purpose of
philosophy, a purpose which his own work must then fulfil\.
4.115 It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.
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There is an indisputable correlation between what Wittgenstein feels should be the
accomplishment of philosophy, and what he felt to be the purpose of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. Namely, to set a limit to what can be said. It has been supposed that the limit is
placed in language because in this way it is perceptible to the senses. One is still, however, faced
with the problem of how this limit can be perceived. The fact that the limit cannot be in thought
because both sides of the limit are not thinkable, also prevents this limit from being stated in
language. One must consider in what way language can present a perceptible limit to itself,
without stating it. The wording of the above proposition, 4.115, gives a clue. Philosophy will
signify what cannot be said. While language may not be able to say what cannot be said, it can, in
being perceptible to the senses, somehow demonstrate what cannot be said. This is the essence of
the Doctrine of Showing, that there are things which cannot be said, but which can be shown.
The following chapter will explore the problem of how there can be a limit to language that can
be perceived by the senses and yet not be stated.
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Chapter 2
The second chapter will give an answer, in terms of the Tractatus, to the problem of how there
can be a limit to language that is perceptible and yet unsayable. It will first be discussed what
Wittgenstein allows that might be said in any language. It will be concluded that all that can be
said is that which is presented through a picture, as a possibility in logical space. Next to be
explored will be the features of any picture which cause them to represent only possibilities, and
this out of necessity. It wi 11 be seen that all pictures must hold what will be called the pictorial
relation, a relation which holds a picture distinct from the reality which it pictures, thereby
allowing a picture to have the possibility of being false, while still acting as a means of
comparison of the picture with its depicted reality. This will bring about the conclusion that the
limit between what can be said and what cannot be said is a limit between that which exists as a
possibility and that which is guaranteed of its truth or falsity. The final section of this chapter
will discuss those things, which in accordance with the Doctrine of Showing can be shown in
language, but not said. It will conclude that the subject matter which cannot be stated in
language, but only shown is the logical form of language and the world, as well as the view of the
world as a limited whole.
2.1 What can be said
This section will explore what, according to the Tractatus, can be said in any language, and why
it can be said. It will first be asserted that Wittgenstein believed that propositions oflanguage can
represent only that which finds itself in the world. Further, in that pictures must be distinct from
the portion of the world that they depict, it will be said that Wittgenstein felt pictures to occupy
logical space. Finally, it will be argued that pictures, in presenting situations in logical space,
present mere possibilities.
Wittgenstein's view, which has been presented up to this point, is that what can be stated in
language through a proposition, is capable of being so represented because it is a thought, which
in turn is a logical picture. The importance of a picture being logical is that it is, Wittgenstein
asserts, only by this means that a picture can represent anything in the world. Logic is nothing
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greater than a reflection ofthe world, a reflection of that which is subject to law. It is
correspondingly disallowed that a picture can represent anything outside of the realm of logic.
What a picture can signify, what it is limited to signifying, is something in the world, something
logical. It has already been presented in proposition 3.032 that propositions oflanguage, in
necessarily being pictures, cannot picture anything outside of that which exists in the logical
world. Indeed, 3.032 states that it is impossible for a proposition oflanguage to represent
anything but that which finds itself in logic. With logic being nothing more than a reflection of
the world which is subject to law, a proposition of language cannot represent anything but that
which might find itself in the world. This statement may at first seem radical, however, there is
evidence in the Tractatus, that this is exactly what Wittgenstein intended one to understand.
Take, for example, the proposition 5.61.
5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in
logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.' For that would appear to
presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it
would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way
could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot
think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
This proposition clearly imparts that it is impossible to state by means of a logical picture, which
is the only means of stating according to Wittgenstein, anything outside of the world. The reason
given is, that making a statement about something that does not exist in the world would require
logic to go beyond the boundaries of the world, something obviously impossible, since logic is
merely a mirror-image of the world. One seems justified in reading the Tractatus as asserting
that what can be said, what can be pictured, is that which exists in the logical space of the world.
The view that there exists such a logical space of the world is presented within the work, and it is
used to explain how language-pictures depict the world. It will be very helpful, therefore, to
describe Wittgenstein's conception and use of this notion of logical space. The first helpful
proposition to be found on this topic is 2.202.
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
21
The significance ofthis statement will most easily be seen in terms of what, it asserts, it is that a
picture represents: a possible situation in logical space. This is not the first assertion to be
discussed regarding that which is depicted by a picture. It was earlier said, in proposition 2.221,
that what a picture represents is its sense. Seen in coordination, propositions 2.221 and 2.202
seem to claim that the sense of a proposition can also be understood as a possible situation in
logical space. This definition of 'sense' undoubtedly fits into the definition already given,
namely that it is the presentation of a situation which might pertain in the world. As can be seen,
this situation is only a possible situation, it is not guaranteed to exist in the world simply because
it is pictured. It is for this reason that proposition 2.222 states that the truth or falsehood of a
picture is determined by the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality. If the possible
situation, which is the sense of a picture, actually exists in reality, then the picture is true; if not, it
is false. It must be emphasized, for it is a concept that will be returned to often in this analysis of
the Tractatus, that a picture depicts a possibility.
It seems that Wittgenstein also asserts in proposition 2.202 that a picture can present a possibility
because a/the notion of logical space. It may not seem immediately apparent that the existence
of logical space is what creates this possibility. However, upon investigation, this becomes clear.
Firstly, one should refer back to the propositions, discussed previously, 2.173 and 2.18. The
essence of these statements is that a picture must necessarily exist independently ofthat portion
of the world that it pictures, but the picture must still have something in common with the reality
that it depicts, namely the logical form of the world. A picture must, in order to be able to
represent the world, be subject to law, just as the world is. However, a picture cannot exist within
that same portion of the world that it depicts; it must exist separately. To allow for this,
Wittgenstein introduces the concept of logical space. A picture can exist in logical space, in
which it is subject to the same laws as the world, but it also can remain distinct from the world.
Logic is, as previously established, the possibility of being governed by law. Logic can be
abstracted from the world, without exceeding the limits of the world. In this way, logical space is
that theoretical space inside which, those things that exist are subject to law.
Certain propositions in the Tractatus indicate that Wittgenstein felt that logic embodies the notion
of possibility, in such a way that pictures, which are necessarily logical, can present a situation as
a possibility. To start, the proposition 3.411 lends the understanding that a position in theoretical
space, a place, is of its nature a possibility.
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3.411 In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility: something can exist in it.
In the physical world, a place in space has the possibility of being filled by some object.
Similarly in the theoretical space of geometry, and more importantly, of logic, a place also has the
possibility of having something exist in it. By noting that a place has the possibility of being
filled, Wittgenstein is at the same time saying that this space must not be filled by any object, nor
must it be filled by a specific object. In his way, Wittgenstein is asserting that logical space is a
collection of places which may not be filled by specific entities, or at all, but when they are filled,
this is done in accordance with the laws that govern the world. Logical space must, then, be an
embodiment of possibility. It is a collection of places, which can be filled by any of a number of
possibilities, so long as this possibility is subject to law. In this way, a picture, by existing in
logical space, can present a possibility. A picture presents one of a number of possibilities that
can fill some place in logical space. In the same way, a proposition of language also presents a
possible situation in logical space. As discussed previously, the sense of a proposition is a
possible situation. One might say that this possible situation portrayed in the proposition fills a
place in logical space. Wittgenstein could be said to agree with this account, for a very similar
conclusion presents itself in the proposition 3.4.
3.4 The proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is
guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents-by the existence of the proposition
with a sense.
A straight reading of this proposition tells that the fact that a picture can depict a situation in
logical space guarantees that there is a place which can possibly be filled by it. However, given
what is known about logical pictures and logical space, one must be able to read more deeply into
this statement. The following interpretation is possible, and indeed justified. Because a picture,
in being logical, conforms to the same laws as the world, the fact that it can present a situation
requires that this situation be possible. Further evidence for this interpretation is to be found in
the following proposition.
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2.203 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.
It is due to the fact that a picture presents a situation in logical space, that this situation must be a
possibility. A picture can present a situation in logical space because a picture has logical form, it
is part and parcel of a picture to be subject to law. In having logical form, and thus existing in
logical space, a picture must exist in a logical place, which has no more than the possibility of
being filled. And this logical place is filled; the possibility is presented in the form of the
situation that the picture depicts. To put this very simply, a picture represents a possibility. A
picture can do no more than represent a possibility because a picture only exists in logical space,
not in that portion ofthe world that it pictures, therefore, a picture can only fill a place in logical
space, and what fills this place can only be one of a number of possibilities. From what has been
presented, it seems that the Tractatus requires that all that can be pictured, and therefore, all that
can be said, is that which has only the possibility of existing.
2.2 The pictorial relation and pictures as possibilities
This section will put forward the claim that all pictures, according to the Tractatus, must hold
what will be called the pictorial relation, a relation which holds a picture distinct from the reality
which it pictures, while still acting as a means of comparison of the picture with its depicted
reality. It will be seen that it is through the pictorial relation that a picture can come to have
'sense,' this 'sense' being nothing more than a possible situation in logical space. It is in this way
that a picture, in representing a sense, must have the possibility of representing incorrectly, of
being false. The conclusion will then be reached that the limit between what can be said and
what cannot be said in language is a limit between that which exists as a possibility and that
which is guaranteed of its truth.
It is indisputable that Wittgenstein felt that pictures present a possible situation in logical space,
and therefore, contain the possibility of being either true or false in their representation.
Proposition 2.18, discussed previously, indicates that a picture can depict, correctly or incorrectly,
truly or falsely, because it shares the logical form of the world. It is then given in 2.223 that the
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truth or falsity of a picture is determinable. Further, the truth or falsity of a picture, whether it
depicts correctly or incorrectly, is determined through comparison with the portion of pictured
reality.
2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
It is in the 2.151 statements that that Wittgenstein indicates how it is that a picture is compared to
reality, through a pictorial relation which lays the picture up against reality for comparison.
2.1511 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure.
2.15121 Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured.
2.1513 So a picture, conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it
into a picture.
An image, according to these statements, does not become a picture until it comes to possess the
pictorial relation. There are two requirements which have been given for pictures in the
Tractatus. One, as was seen in the previous section, is that a picture must represent a merely
possible situation in logical space, thereby having the possibility of depicting incorrectly. The
other is that any picture must hold the pictorial relation. It will be seen that the latter entails the
former.
It has been stated that Wittgenstein believed the pictorial relation to be the means by which the
sense of a picture is compared with the world. However, it seems that in so doing, the pictorial
relation serves a second purpose, namely, to hold the picture distinct from that portion of the
world that it depicts. The pictorial relation allows a picture to exist as a representative of some
other portion of logical space, by concurrently separating it from, and comparing it to the part of
logical space that it represents. If not for the pictorial relation, a picture, in existing in logical
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space, would be indistinguishable from the world. This point may need clarification. Consider a
photograph, which, while being a picture of some part of the world, still exists in the physical
world. It cannot, however, exist in that small portion of the world of which it is a picture. Say
the photograph were to be placed in that portion of the world which it pictures, this would not
qualify it as existing in that part of the world which it pictured, because that part of the world
would no longer exist, it would be new, with the photograph as one of its parts. In considering
this example, it is clear that a photograph is distinguishable from the world; it exists as a physical
object in the world. Similarly, any other form of picture exists equally in logical space with all
other entities in logical space, including the world. What allows a picture to exist in logical space
as a picture, a representation of the world, is the pictorial relation. The pictorial relation
establishes a direct link between the picture and its depicted reality. In this way, the picture is
held, as necessary, distinct from the reality it represents. At the same time, this relation acts as a
means of comparison whereby the truth or falsity of the picture can be determined.
It can now be seen how the pictorial relation allows, by holding a picture distinct from, and
measuring it up against its depicted reality, for a picture to have 'sense.' This can be understood
by making reference to Wittgenstein's discussion of propositions, their signs and their projective
relation to the world. Propositions 3.11 and 3.12 describe a propositional sign as being that with
which one is able to perceive the sense of a proposition. It is this sense which is projected onto
the world, which is measured up against the world5•
3.1 I We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a
possible situation. The method of projection is to think the sense of the proposition.
3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. - And a proposition is
a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
These thoughts on propositions can easily be transposed into a view on pictures, and validly so
since propositions are necessarily pictures. A picture, like the proposition described in 3.11 and
3.12, communicates a sense, and it is this sense which is measured up against the world through a
5 I am equating the 'method of projection' with the pictorial relation here to avoid slipping into the
psychologism which might be implied by considering 'method of projection' to be equivalent to Frege's
'mode of presentation.'
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pictorial relation. This description imparts no new information on the nature of either pictures or
the pictorial relation. The noteworthy comments appear in proposition 3.13.
3.13 A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected.
Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is. A proposition,
therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing
it. ('The content of a proposition' means the content of a proposition that has sense.) A
proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.
This proposition does not seem to accord with the understanding of a proposition as a picture
which has 'sense' necessarily when it says that a proposition does not contain it's sense, but only
the possibility of this sense. One must look to the notion of 'sense' again, in order to clarify the
understanding of 3.136• 'Sense', it has been said, is the presentation of a situation which might
pertain in the world. As an example, 'Sense' would state 'this particular leaf, on this particular
tree, has this particular property,' not any property of any leaf on any tree, or that property of any
leaf on that particular tree. The specific applications of property, leaf and tree required for
'sense' can only come through direct reference to the world? In order to express the particular
sense of the picture, the picture must be laid against reality via the pictorial relation, which can
then indicate 'this tree, this leaf and this property.' A picture not connected to the world via the
pictorial relation would only be able to contain variables which can then be filled in when it is
directly associated with the world8• It is in this way that a proposition can be said not to contain
its sense, but only the possibility of representing it. That any proposition have 'sense' requires
that all pictures stand in direct relation to the world via the pictorial relation. Without the
pictorial relation, no picture or proposition could have a sense.
This discussion has revealed that the sense ofa proposition isjust one of the possibilities that
could have been signified by the variables contained in the proposition. The pictorial relation, in
6 While it is not relevant to this reading on.13, the proposition can be seen as Wittgenstein's response to
Russell's problem of the sense ofajudgment. Russell felt that ajudgment proposition had to include the
objects, the relations that pertain as well as the form that these take, in order to prevent a nonsensical
judgment. A lucid explanation ofthis theory is to be found in Wahl (1986).
? It is this immediate acquaintance of the parts of a proposition with the relevant entities in reality that
distinguishes this view from the more cognitive view of Frege, in which sense is more closely associated
with the thought-content of the speaker of a proposition, whereby sense determines reference. See 'On
Sense and Meaning' (1892) in Geach (1952) pages 56-78
8 A similar idea is put forth by lames Griffin. He associates the sense of a proposition with a particular
occasion of the use of the names contained in it, this view being adapted from P. F. Strawson in 'On
Referring.' See Griffin (1964) pages 130-131.
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allowing for 'sense' through a direct correspondence of a picture with the world, specifies one
possibility. One can see from this that, in holding the pictorial relation necessarily, pictures, and
therefore, propositions can only represent possible situations in logical space. However, it must
be clarified that it is only the situations which are the possibilities in logical space. The entities
which make up the situation exist necessarily in logical space. When the sense of a picture, a
possible situation, is held up against the world, the pictorial relation correlates the entities in the
sense with the relevant entities in real ity. This idea is captured in the proposition 2.15121, which
states that the end points of the graduating lines of the relation between 'sense' and reality touch
the objects to be measured. It is the situation presented in a sense, not the entities themselves
which is being compared with reality for truth or falsity. It is the situation that has the possibility
of being presented incorrectly, such that the picture presenting this sense can be false. Thus, the
requirement, presented previously, that pictures, and therefore propositions, must have the
possibility of being false is entailed in a picture representing a situation which has only the
possibility of pertaining in reality. The above discussion has revealed a noteworthy point about
the pictorial relation. The pictorial relation allows for there to be a separation between truth and
meaning for pictures. A picture's being false does not require that it cannot still represent
something. A picture must represent something, and that something is its sense, a possible
situation in logical space.
It has been seen that Wittgenstein feels that pictures must be held up against reality by the
pictorial relation in order for the truth or falsity of that picture to be determined. If pictures did
not have the possibility of being false, then the Tractatus would not have to present the
requirement that a picture be compared to the world via the pictorial relation, because the truth of
the picture would be known without this comparison. Pictures, in this case, would be true a
priori, this truth precluding the role ofthe pictorial relation. Wittgenstein, through the
proposition 2.225, confirms the central role of the pictorial relation, and the nature of pictures as
possibilities in denying that there might be any pictures which are guaranteed of their truth.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori
It is now possible to sum up what has been discovered thus far, and place this understanding in
terms of the limit that has been said to exist between what can be said and what cannot be stated
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in language. All that can be said in language is that which can be pictured. All that can be
pictured is that which does not hold necessarily. Further, that which is a possibility and therefore
picturable, must exist in logical space, the realm of things which do exist necessarily. That
which, on the other hand, does not exist in logical space, or that which is true a priori cannot be
depicted in a picture. This brings about the conclusion that the limit between what can be said
and what cannot be said in language is a limit between that which exists as a possibility in logical
space and that which is guaranteed of its truth.
2.3 What can be shown
As the previous section dealt with those things which exist as possibilities in logical space, this
section will handle those things in logical space which are guaranteed of their truth. First to be
discussed will be the Doctrine of Showing, whereby Wittgenstein felt certain a priori truths to be
shown in language, rather than stated. It will then be revealed that, in the Tractatus there are two
such a priori truths which are consistently the subject matter ofthat which is inexpressible in
language. The first is the logical form of language, the second, the view that the world is a
limited whole.
Wittgenstein's view in the Tractatus has been presented to be that what can be said in language is
that which exists as a possibility in logical space, and therefore, contains the possibility of being
true or false. What will be discussed now are those things which are guaranteed of their truth or
falsity, namely tautologies and contradictions. Wittgenstein states explicitly that neither a
proposition containing a tautology, nor one containing a contradiction can be a picture. In that
neither is a picture, neither, according to the Tractatus can state anything about the world. It will,
however, be revealed in the ensuing discussion that these forms of proposition show something
about the world. Herein is the essence of the Doctrine of Showing, that there are things which are
necessarily true about the world which cannot be stated in language, but only shown. The
proposition 4.462 is a good starting point from which to explore this idea. The association
between picturability, existing as a possibility and containing the pictorial relation, which has
been attributed to Wittgenstein in previous argument, is echoed in this proposition.
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4.462 Tautologies and contradiction are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any
possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations, and the latter none. In a
tautology the conditions of agreement with the world - the representational relations-
cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representation relation to reality.
The proposition 4.0621, previously presented, indicated that the opposing propositions 'p' and
'~p' have opposite 'sense', but correspond to the same reality, as they must when given in the
tautology -(p . ~p). It has also been put forth that 'sense' is a result of the connection between a
picture and a portion of the world through the pictorial relation. Further, a sense acts as the truth
condition for a picture. Considered in this light, a tautology has two opposing truth conditions,
which would have to be established through two rival pictorial relations. These pictorial relations
must cancel one another. Wittgenstein alleges that this prevents a tautology from standing in
relation to the world at all, which would substantiate the claim that a tautology cannot be a
picture. There is, however, nothing that prevents a tautology from being logical, which it is. A
tautology shares the logical form ofthe world, however, it does not stand in connection to the
world. This, one can assume, grants it the capability of being true for all possibilities. To put this
in more understandable terms, an example of a tautology would be the statement, 'The man is
either here or not here.' Given the existence of the man, this statement can be true for all possible
whereabouts of the man: here, a few steps away, or on the other side of the continent, etc.
However, in that it is not a picture, this tautology cannot represent all ofthese possibilities. A
tautology cannot say anything about the whereabouts of the man, it cannot say anything about the
world. Similarly, a contradiction can also say nothing about the world, for it is true under no
circumstances. Yet, both tautologies and contradictions manage to impart information in some
fashion or another. One can read the proposition 6.1201 as an explanation of this fact.
6.1201 For example, the fact that the propositions 'p' and '-p' in the combination '-(p. -p)' yield
a tautology shows that they contradict one another. The fact that the propositions 'p ::J q',
'p', and 'q', combined with one another in the form '(p::J q) . (P) :::J : (q)' yield a tautology
shows that q follows from p and p::J q. The fact that '(x) .fx : ::J :fa' is a tautology shows
thatfa follows from (x) .fx. Etc. etc.
If a proposition is either a tautology or a contradiction, then the fact that it is a tautology shows
certain information about the world. They demonstrate certain logical rules and necessities in
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logical space, while they cannot state these. That the statement '''p' and '~p'" yields a tautology,
displays the fact that the two propositions, 'p' and '~p' are contradictory. While a tautology can
show this, it cannot state this. It cannot state that these propositions contradict one another, as it
cannot be pictured that "The fact that the man is here contradicts the fact that the man is not
here." The fact that the tautology cannot stand in connection with the world because the pictorial
relations cancel one another shows that this contradiction in 'sense' exists. In fact, that this
contradiction can be shown in this way prevents it from being stated. This detail is revealing
about Wittgenstein's thoughts on the notion that certain information can be displayed, as
embodied in the following statement.
4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.
A potent example ofthis idea presents itself in the form ofthe pictorial relation itself. If pictures
exist, then the pictorial relation also exists in logical space, acting as a bridge between pictures
and their depicted realities. Therefore, if any picture is to exist, then the pictorial relation must
also exist necessarily. In that pictures do exist, it is a truth that the pictorial relation also exists.
However, no picture is capable of picturing the pictorial relation, and therefore, no proposition
can say that the pictorial relation exists. If a picture were able to depict the pictorial relation, it
would have to picture the relationship between itself and what it represents, which is an
impossibility. In that any picture exists, it is shown that the pictorial relation also exists, and in
that this can be shown, it can never be said.
One can now have a relatively clear picture ofthe Doctrine of Showing that is credited to
Wittgenstein. There are certain things in logical space which, in not being able to be presented as
mere possibilities, cannot be pictured, and therefore, stated. These things can, however, be shown
or demonstrated in some way by that which can be stated in language. Further, what can be
shown in such a way cannot be said. A complete reading of the Tractatus reveals that the
circumstances in which Wittgenstein refers to that which cannot be stated, but rather only shown
are repeated continually. These circumstances seem to reveal what, in essence, he must have felt
needs to be demonstrated, but which he felt cannot be said. The first is that logical form exists
and that it is of a certain nature. The existence of logical form must be shown by the fact that
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pictures and therefore, propositions of language can possibly exist. Consider the following
proposition.
4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its
reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itselfin language, we
cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They
display it.
The logical form of propositions, as was argued earlier, is the logical form of the world. The law
governing the world, and therefore, logic might theoretically be one of a number of different sets
of law. However, this will never be demonstrable, as one cannot breach the limits of the world in
order to view the form of the world as one possibility amongst many. Therefore, it will never be
possible to present the logical form of the world, the same logical form of language, as a
possibility. Logical form will never be picturable, it will simply be displayed in all other pictures
governed by its law.
The idea that logical form can only be, and must be, displayed presents itself numerous times
throughout the Tractatus. Another example regarding the laws that govern the world, of which
logic is a reflection is proposition 6.36. The statement is a characterization of the idea that if a
law exists such that the world might be subject to it, then this can never be pictured or stated in
language, but can only be shown.
6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of
nature. But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest.
Not all of the propositions handling the subject of logical form are concerned with its existence.
Many deal with the nature of this logical form, what of it is actually demonstrated. One instance
is the proposition 6.1201 which put forth the topic of what is demonstrated by tautologies and
contradictions. The notion of showing also presents itself in propositions discussing issues such
as logical equality, as in the following.
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6.23 If two expressions are combined by means of the sign of equality, that means that they can
be substituted for one another. But it must be manifest in the two expressions themselves
whether this is the case or not. When two expressions can be substituted for one another,
that characterizes their logical form.
The logical form of language is only one of the circumstances in which the Doctrine of Showing
appears. The other propositions in which Wittgenstein explicitly states that there is something to
be shown, where something is manifest, seem to fall into a single category. The characteristic
view ofthe propositions in this category is portrayed in the following statements.
6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themseLves manifest.
They are what is mystical.
6.45 To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole--a limited whole. Feeling the
world as a limited whole--it is this that is mystical.
What can be shown, but not said in this case, is that the world is a limited whole. That this is
unsayable is consistent with the views of the Tractatus already propounded. One cannot think
beyond the limits of the world. While one cannot think that which is illogical, namely the other
side of this limited world, that the world must be limited is a truth. That the world is limited must
not be picturable. To refer back to statement 5.61 is helpful. This proposition states that one
cannot state what cannot exist in the world, for it would be stating possibilities beyond the world,
one would be crossing the impassable limit. Proposition 5.62 also handles the subject of the
necessarily limited world, from the point of view of solipsism. In essence, it says, the limits of
language are the manifestation of the limits of the world
5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For
what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of Language (of that
language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
The subject matter of what is inexpressible in language is the logical form of language and the
world, and the view of the world as a limited whole. That these things cannot be stated in
language fits clearly with the tractarian idea that it is that which is guaranteed of its truth in
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logical space that can only be shown. The Doctrine of Showing allows it to be discernable that
there is a limit between that which is expressible in language and that which is not, by making
both sides ofthat limit perceptible.
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Chapter 3
The previous chapter dealt with those things which Wittgenstein felt can be put into words, and
those that cannot be said, but rather only shown. This chapter is concerned with that which
cannot either be said or shown, that which Wittgenstein, in his preface, calls' nonsense.' The first
step will be to characterize 'nonsense,' in terms ofthe Tractatus, as those propositions that cannot
have 'sense' due to the preclusion of one or more of their constituents from being correlated with
reality. It will thereafter be discussed how Wittgenstein felt that his propositions, which must,
according to their own standards, be nonsensical, can convey information. It will be argued that
Wittgenstein must have considered his propositions to be of the same general form as
propositions which have 'sense'
3.1 'Nonsense'
This section will characterize 'nonsense' in terms of the Tractatus as the impossibility of having
'sense' through the preclusion of one or more of the constituents of a propositions from being
correlated with reality via the pictorial relation.
Previous discussion has revealed that for Wittgenstein the essential requirement for 'sense' is that
it be able to correspond with reality. The characterization of 'nonsense' must, therefore, be
concerned with showing the inability of a nonsensical statement to correspond with reality via the
pictorial relation. Evidence for this reading is to be found in the proposition 5.473, in which the
symbolic language of logic is discussed. It asserts that it must be possible for the symbols of
logic to stand for something. Whether a symbol has a meaning in the context of the statement is
what determines the 'sense' or 'nonsense' of the logical statement.
5.473 Logic must look after itself. If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying.
Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted. (The reason why 'Socrates is identical'
means nothing is that there is no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical
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because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because the symbol, in
itself, would be illegitimate.) In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.
This proposition seems to say that the statement' Socrates is identical' is nonsensical because it
cannot be a picture, and therefore correspond to the world via the pictorial relation, due to the fact
that the word 'identical' lacks meaning in the sentence. The structure of the sentence itself, what
might be called its 'logical structure' is valid. If some meaningful expression were to replace the
word' identical' in this statement, it would be possible for the statement, then, to be a picture, by
corresponding to the world via the pictorial relation. In this case' identical' would have to
indicate a property rather than a relation, which is its normal syntactical usage, for the statement
to be able to correspond to reality via the pictorial relation. It seems that Wittgenstein makes an
appeal to Russell here, if one were to understand his argument to be that the statement that
'Socrates is identical' does not denote anything, and in having no denotation, cannot form a
picture. According to Russell's theory of descriptions, 'Socrates is identical' cannot denote
anything because it does not present a description which can be uniquely satisfied by 'Socrates,'
which in turn can be determined to be either true or false. 9 One can see that in not denoting
anything, it is impossible for the statement 'Socrates is identical' to be correlated with reality via
the pictorial relation and therefore, have 'sense.'
One can see at this point that to be 'nonsense' is more than to lack 'sense' by not being correlated
to some portion of reality via the pictorial relation. It is the impossibility of being so correlated
that defines something as nonsensical, in terms of the Tractatus. It is for this reason that
Wittgenstein did not consider tautologies and contradictions to be nonsensical, though they lack
'sense.' The proposition 4.4611 illustrates this.
4.4611 Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of the
symbolism, much as '0' is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.
One must remember from the previous discussion of tautologies and contradictions that
propositions of this type do not have 'sense' because the pictorial relations for each of their
disparate assertions cancel one another. The statement 'The man is here or the man is not here'
9 See 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' in Russell (1917) pages 209-232.
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presents two opposing possible situations. Nothing, however, prevents each one of these possible
situations, taken on its own, from standing in relation to the world via the pictorial relation and
thereby having 'sense.' By presenting the confliction statements together, one is presented with
the limit of possibilities. The same must hold true for contradictions, which present the opposite
limit to possibilities, comparable to zero. Of chief importance in understanding why tautologies
and contradictions are not considered nonsensical is the fact that it is possible for each of the
constituents of these propositions to be correlated with the world. 'Nonsense' must be more than
not having 'sense,' it must be the impossibility of having 'sense' through the preclusion of one or
more of the constituents from being correlated with reality.
3.2 The propositions of the Tractatus and the general form of propositions
This section will argue that Wittgenstein, in identifying the propositions of the Tractatus as
nonsensical, must have considered them to be of the same general form as propositions which
have 'sense,' such that they might still be informative, as he thought them to be. It will first be
put forth that Wittgenstein's propositions demonstrate that there are certain forms that
propositions can validly take. It will then be asserted that the propositions of the Tractatus, in
being of a general form reveal that the structures of propositions stand in internal relations to one
another. This, in turn, reveals that the structures of situations in reality stand in internal relations
to one another. The internal relations between the propositions representing these situations,
mirroring the relations between the structures of situations in reality, reflect logical truths about
the world and form a 'logic of propositions.' 10
In being that which does not contain the possibility of having 'sense,' 'nonsense' can be
understood, in terms of the Tractatus, as that which can neither be said nor shown. Wittgenstein
expresses the view that in general, philosophy attempts to contend with the 'nonsensical.' It is of
little surprise then, that Wittgenstein expresses the following attitude towards philosophy.
10 This term is taken from Fogelin (1976) who uses it as a chapter heading.
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4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but
nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can
only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of
philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong
to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the
beautiful.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at
all.
Undeniably, Wittgenstein felt it enough ofa problem that in philosophy attempts are made to say
what he felt cannot be said, to write the only book published in his life in an effort to reveal this.
Unfortunately, in so doing, Wittgenstein finds himself guilty of transgressing the limit of the
sayable. The propositions of the Tractatus, as he admits in proposition 6.54, are nonsensical.
6.36 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them-as steps-to climb up
beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throwaway the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
However, that one can come to understand these statements to be nonsensical demonstrates that
they must in some way remain informative about that which cannot be put into words.
If the propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, this must be because one or more of their
constituents cannot be correlated with at least some portion ofthe world. It seems to follow that
one could theoretically replace these 'nonsensical' constituents with constituents that can connect
with the world, resulting in a proposition with a sense. It seems that, while remaining
nonsensical, the tractarian propositions are of the same general form ofthose propositions that
can have a sense. This might be the way in which Wittgenstein felt his statements to be
informative: they demonstrate a general form of propositions. There is no doubt that the
Tractatus propounds that a general form of propositions exists. Further, there is strong evidence
that Wittgenstein would concur on the idea that the propositions of the Tractatus show the
general form of propositions because the 'nonsensical' constituents could be replaced with
sensical ones. This would be in accordance with the view put forth in the statement of 3.315.
3.315 Ifwe turn a constituent of a proposition into a variable, there is a class of propositions all
of which are values of the resulting variable proposition. In general, this class too will be
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dependent on the meaning that our arbitrary conventions have given to parts of the
original proposition. But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings
are turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind. This one, however, is not
dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the proposition. It corresponds to
a logical form-a logical proto-type.
It seems that nonsensical propositions, as well as those representing a sense are capable of being
generalized in the manner described in this proposition. To refer back to the previous example of
'Socrates is identical,' 3.315 indicates that the parts of this statement which have arbitrarily
determined meanings, namely 'Socrates' and 'identical,' are replaceable with variables resulting
in a generalized proposition capable of representing all propositions of the form 'x is y'. It is then
possible that 'x' and 'y' can be replaced with a name and property, each in its correct syntactical
function, thereby allowing the proposition to represent a sense.
The above proposition puts forth the idea that a proposition containing multiple variables when
generalized can only exist as a logical proto-type of a class of propositions which all have the
same form. There are many forms that propositions can take, 'x isy' beingjust one. This
thought must have prompted Wittgenstein to acknowledge that one form cannot represent any
other, thereby concluding in proposition 4.53 that the most general propositional form can only be
captured in a variable.
4.53 The general propositional form is a variable.
While being nonsensical, Wittgenstein surely felt that his propositions display at least a selection
of the valid forms that any proposition can take on when representing a sense. In that the form of
a proposition cannot itself be the subject matter of a picture, the fact that there are specific valid
forms that propositions can take on must be a demonstrable truth, but not one that can be stated.
Given the definition presented previously, that form is the possibility of structure, any proposition
presenting a sense must display the actual structure of its sense. Wittgenstein's nonsensical
propositions, on the other hand, do not take on any actual structure of a situation in logical space,
they must rather portray the possibility of taking on various structures. That there are certain
valid forms of propositions must be one of the unstatable truths that Wittgenstein felt his
propositions to be informative about.
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Ifthe constituents of Wittgenstein's propositions were to be meaningfully replaced with others,
such that the propositions came to have 'sense,' then each ofWittgenstein's propositions could
validly represent a multitude of different senses. This in itself is revealing about the nature of the
world, namely, that the structures of situations in the world are related to one another. That
situations in the world are connected to one another is a truth about the world, a manifestation of
the internal nature of the situations. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein states that situations
stand in internal relations to one another ll . Further, he asserts in the proposition 4.125 that these
relations are reflected in the internal relations between the structures ofthe propositions
representing these situations.
4.125 The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses itself in language
by means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them.
It must be explored what sorts of truths about the world are revealed through the internal relations
between the structures of situations, and therefore the structures of the propositions representing
these possible situations. Consider again the tautology 'The man is either here or not here.' The
conflicting propositions presented in this tautology prevents it from having a sense. The fact that
these propositions contradict one another cannot be meaningfully stated in a single proposition.
However, that the possibility ofthe totality of situations represented by these propositions exists
in the world is an a priori truth about the world. This is part of the logical form of the world. If
each of the conflicting situations, such as 'The man is here,' 'The man is five meters away,' 'The
man is on another continent,' etc. were to be presented in its own separate proposition, then the
structures of these propositions would show themselves to be contradictory. These propositions
would, therefore, sta'nd in relation to one another via an immediate internal relation. The
importance in acknowledging these internal relations is that they, in reflecting logical necessities,
cannot be pictured and can only be expressed in a 'logic of propositions' whereby the structures
of propositions reflecting possible situations stand in relation to certain others. That Wittgenstein
I I Internal relations were characterized by the idealists as being grounded in the intrinsic natures of the
terms related. While Wittgenstein acknowledges that such relations exist, he in no way thereby commits
himself to the idealist view, rejected previously by Russell, that all relations are internal relations. It would
have to follow from this belief, as it did for the idealists, that each part of the whole of reality has an
intrinsic nature which exhibits relations to every other part of the whole. In not committing himself to this
view, Wittgenstein allows himself the freedom of the belief in an epistemological and ontological atomism
in which each thing that exists can be understood in isolation from all other things.
40
intended one to understand that there is a so-called 'logic of propositions' is expressed in
propositions such as 5.131.
5.131 If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds expression in
relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another: nor is it necessary
for us to set up these relations between them, by combining them with one another in a
single proposition; on the contrary, the relations are internal and their existence is an
immediate result of the existence of the propositions.
If it is the case that the truth of a proposition follows from the truth of another, Wittgenstein
seems to claim that this relation must be demonstrated through the internal relation pertaining
between the structures of the pertinent propositions. Further evidence for a 'logic of
propositions' in the Tractatus presents itselfin the form of the proposition 5.21 where it is stated
that all propositions must stand in internal relation to one or more other propositions.
5.21 In order to give prominence to these internal relations we can adopt the following mode of
expression: we can represent a proposition as the result of an operation that produces it
out of other propositions (which are the bases of the operation).
This statement seems to indicate that internal relations are logical truths about the world.
While the exact nature of the operation referred to is not influential in the present discussion, the
following comment on it reveals that an operation is the expression of an internal relation that
already exists between the structures of the relevant propositions.
5.22 An operation is the expression of a relation between the structures of its result and of its
bases.
The internal relations that form the' logic of propositions' mirror the internal relations that exist
between the structures of situations in the world. Thus, the' logic of propositions' reflects certain
a priori truths about the world which are manifested in the internal relations holding between the
structures of situations in reality.
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In conclusion, the propositions of the Tractatus reveal first, that there is a general form of
propositions, to be capable of representing a sense. Secondly, they reveal that there is a 'logic of
propositions' reflecting a priori truths about the world. Wittgenstein's propositions, while being
nonsensical by their own standards are able to lay bare these truths only in so far as they
themselves demonstrate the general form of a proposition.
Summary
It can be said that Part one has shown, as it was hoped, that the pictorial relation plays a central
role in the Tractatus in allowing for the propositions contained within the work to remain
informative, while they are nonsensical according to their own standards. This is apparent in the
following summary of Wittgenstein's ideas as discussed in Part one.
It was argued that Wittgenstein's propositions are informative in so far as they demonstrate the
general form of propositions which are capable of representing a sense. The tractarian
propositions, while they may not state anything because they are nonsensical, show certain truths
about the world, and in so doing, about the form of language which is a reflection of the logic of
the world. It is, therefore, clear that if these propositions are going to be informative in this way,
there must be a strict characterization of 'sense.' A precise definition of 'sense' allows that there
can be a distinction first, between 'sense' and 'nonsense' and second, between what can be stated
and what can be shown. It was seen that the definition of 'sense' depends upon any proposition
representing a sense having the possibility of being false. In order to have the possibility of being
false, any picture cum proposition must be held distinct from the reality which it pictures, and
must have a means of comparison of that picture with its depicted reality such that its truth or




The purpose of part two ofthis thesis is to draw attention to the requirements that must be met by
the Tractatus if the pictorial relation is to act as a means of comparison between a proposition and
reality, such that the truth or falsity of that proposition is determinable. Part one revealed that the
pictorial relation must be able to play this vital role ifthe propositions ofthe Tractatus are to
remain informative while they are nonsensical by their own standards. The first demand which
must be met, if the pictorial relation is to serve its given purpose, is that the truth or falsity of a
proposition must be determinable by correlation of its sense with nothing more than the situation
it depicts in reality. The twofold tractarian response to this demand will be addressed in chapter
four. Chapter five is concerned with the demand that a proposition be able to represent no more
than one sense, a requirement that I feel is answered by Wittgenstein's account of logical
multiplicity. This will involve giving a unique reading of logical multiplicity, a concept which I
feel is unjustly brushed over in the literature currently available on the Tractatus. To my
knowledge, the majority of works in the literature approach the topic of logical multiplicity
biased by already formulated views on the nature of objects, views which equate logical
multiplicity with the number of distinguishable elements in a situation. I choose to approach the
topic differently, for I feel that there is evidence in the Tractatus that the notion of logical
multiplicity goes beyond this equation and can shed light on how to approach the topic of
distinguishable elements. This will in turn influence the discussion of the status of objects in the
Tractatus, a topic to be addressed in chapter six.
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Chapter 4
This chapter will handle the subject of what is required if the pictorial relation is to act as a means
of comparison between a picture and the reality it depicts such that the verity or falsehood of the
picture can be determined. First to be discussed will be Wittgenstein's requirement that a
proposition have a sense that is independent of the sense of any other proposition. It will be
revealed that this requirement is only met if simple objects exist. The conclusion will also be
reached that the truth or falsity of a proposition should be determinable by comparison of the
sense of a picture solely to its depicted reality. In the following section the tractarian account of
simple objects will be shown to establish that the existence of any state of affairs depends solely
upon the internal properties of the objects that constitute it. It will then be argued that it is only in
the case when the nature of simple objects determines the possibility of existence of states of
affairs that the pictorial relation can serve its purpose of acting as a means of comparison between
the sense of a proposition and its depicted reality so that the truth or falsity of a proposition can
be determined.
4.1 Simple objects and the independence of 'sense'
This section will explain Wittgenstein's requirement that simple objects exist ifit is to be possible
to form a picture that represents a sense independent of any other sense, such that the truth or
falsity ofthat 'sense' is determinable through the pictorial relation. This will be accomplished by
exposing that the Tractatus purports that if the substance ofthe world were complexes rather than
simples, then one would be caught in an infinite regress of propositions acting as descriptions,
which are incapable of representing a sense independent of the sense of another proposition.
The primary argument for simple objects allowing for it to be possible to form pictures
representing a sense is laid out in the 2.021 statements.
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2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.
2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on
whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).
The argument will be most clear if the statements of2.0211 and 2.0212 are first merged in the
following manner. Ifthe world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition was true. If whether a proposition had sense depended on
whether another proposition were true, then we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or
false). It seems that Wittgenstein would want one to construct two modus tollens arguments out
of these statements, for if the Tractatus is to be consistent, it would have to say that it is possible
to form true and false pictures of the world. Thus, as it is possible to sketch both true and false
pictures of the world, then whether a proposition has sense does not depend upon whether another
proposition is true. Given that a proposition's having 'sense' does not depend on whether another
proposition is true, the world must, therefore, have substance. 12 2.021 then adds the view that the
substance of the world is simple, as opposed to complex objects. While the argument is given
here that simple objects allow for the possibility of forming a picture capable of representing a
sense, it does not lend any enlightenment as to the reasons for this belief.
An exposition of the tractarian view on propositions about complexes will be revealing as to why
it is said that complexes cannot form the substance of the world. Further, it will reveal why
Wittgenstein felt that simple objects allow for a picture to represent a sense which the pictorial
relation can correlate with reality. The most informative commentary on complexes is to be
found in the proposition 3.24.
3.24 A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition about a
constituent of the complex. A complex can be given only by its description, which will be
right or wrong. A proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the
complex does not exist, but simply false. When a propositional element signifies a complex,
this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such
cases, we know that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation
12 This helpful reading is given by Griffin in his (1964) page 65.
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for generality contains a prototype.) The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a
simple symbol can be expressed in a definition.
This proposition asserts that any proposition concerning a complex can only give a description of
that complex. This is revealing, in that a description can only speak about how things are, not
what they are. A description it seems could only ever give the form of a complex, stating how
things in that complex are, and not the content, what the things in the complex are. That a
description can only give the form of a complex and not its specific content is indicated in the
fifth sentence of this proposition, which states that a proposition concerning a complex contains a
prototype, that it leaves something undetermined. What is left undetermined must be the specific
content, the specific things, that can fit into that prototype.
On this understanding of propositions concerning complexes, such a proposition could never have
a sense in the way that 'sense' has been defined in the Tractatus. 'Sense,' it has been seen, is
required to be the presentation of a specific situation which might pertain. A proposition acting
as a description which presents the form and not the content of a complex has the possibility, in
being a prototype, of representing all the situations having that form, not just one specific one. In
order for a proposition concerning a complex to have a sense, another proposition asserting the
specific instance, the specific situation to which the description applies must be true. However, if
the proposition specifying this situation is itself a description of a complex, it's sense will
similarly depend upon the truth of another proposition. The tractarian view must be that if there
are only propositions which are descriptions, then this regress will carry on ad infinitum. In order
to stop this regress, one must be able at some point to give a content rather than a more specific
form. This content must be what Wittgenstein calls the substance of the world in the propositions
2.021 and 2.0211: objects. The arguments presented up to this point imply that these objects
cannot be complex objects. The proposition 2.02 states clearly the tractarian view that the objects
which are the substance ofthe world are not complex.
2.02 Objects are simple
Wittgenstein's argument can be summed up as saying that if it is going to be possible for a
proposition to have a sense, independent of the sense of any other proposition, then there must be
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simple objects which can act as the content of that sense. In other words, simple objects allow for
a proposition to represent a sense, such that the truth or falsity ofthat proposition can be
determined simply by comparison of its sense to its depicted reality, independent of the sense of
any other proposition. The following section will lay out the tractarian conditions which must be
in place if the verity or falsehood of a proposition is to be determined solely by comparison to
that portion ofthe world that it depicts, and no other.
4.2 Simple objects, states of affairs and the function of the pictorial relation
This section will delineate Wittgenstein's account of simple objects as possessing internal
properties. It will be established that this account provides that the possibility that any state of
affairs exist depends solely upon the internal properties ofthe constituting objects. It will then be
argued that this account allows for the pictorial relation to determine the truth or falsity of a
proposition by correlating the sense of a picture with nothing more than its depicted reality.
Wittgenstein's account of simple objects involves a distinction between internal and external or
material properties. Simple objects, he claims, have internal properties which, it will be seen,
determine the combinations that they form. It is asserted that it is these combinations of simple
objects which display external, or material properties, not simple objects in isolation. This
contention is seen in the following statement.
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties.
For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented - only by
the configuration of objects that they are produced.
It was previously argued that simple objects are what Wittgenstein calls the substance of the
world. One can, therefore, read this statement as saying that simple objects do not, in isolation,
determine material properties. Propositions which present possible situations in reality,
combinations of simple objects, represent material properties which are generated by the
combinations themselves. It seems that it is the structure of a situation or possible situation, how
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simple objects are combined, that cause material properties. In this light, the first sentence of the
above proposition is revealing about the role that simple objects play in and of themselves: they
determine the forms, the structures possible for situations. This is where internal properties play
a role. Wittgenstein claims that simple objects in isolation have internal properties, and these
internal properties determine the combinations that objects can form. Taken in combination, the
propositions 2.01231 and 2.0123 put forth exactly this argument.
2.01231 If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties.
2.0123 If I know an object, I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Everyone
of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be
discovered later.
Knowing an object involves knowing the internal properties ofthat object and at the same time
knowing all of the states of affairs, or situations in which it can occur. Clearly the internal
properties of an object make up the nature of that object, which, it is said, contains the possibility
of each combination that it might form, each situation in which the object might be a part. The
distinction that Wittgenstein makes between internal and material properties is this: simple
objects have internal properties which determine the combinations which these objects form.
Material properties are produced by the combinations themselves.
As the proposition 2.0231 put forth, it is through the sense of propositions that one is presented
with material properties. In that the Tractatus asserts that one is familiar with material properties
through 'sense,' one can see that Wittgenstein felt that simple objects must form combinations
which produce these material properties. Further, if the sense of a proposition presenting some
material property is to be able to do so without depending upon the truth or falsity of any other
proposition, then the combination of objects which causes this material property must also exist
independently of one another combination of objects. One must conclude that if a combination of
objects is to exist independently of any other situation, then the formation of that combination
must depend on nothing further than the natures of the objects which constitute it.
If one is going to draw this conclusion, then it must be made clear that Wittgenstein felt that
simple objects have it in their nature to form combinations. A good starting point from which to
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argue this is the point, made in the Tractatus that the world consists of more than just the totality
of simple objects existing in isolation from one another.
1.1 The world is the totality offacts, not of things.
While the substance of the world, according to the Tractatus, must be simple objects, the totality
ofthese simple objects is not enough to define the world. This proposition asserts that the world
is completely described not by sum of all objects, but by all facts. One discovers the meaning of
the term 'fact' in proposition 2.
2 What is the case---a fact-is the existence of states of affairs.
A fact, it is said, is the actual existence of one or more state of affairs. This expression 'state of
affairs' finds, in turn, explanation in the statement 2.01.
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
Taken in combination, these propositions assert that the world is completely defined not by
simple objects alone, but by their combination in what are called states of affairs. These states of
affairs must be the situations of reality referred to up to this point. It is further specified that these
combinations of objects consist of objects standing in direct relation to one another. It cannot be
that an object occurs in a state of affairs, without a relation pertaining between that object and at
least one other in the state of affairs. Just this is asserted in the following proposition, 2.031
2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.
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Moreover, in designating the relations that pertain between the objects in states of affairs as
determinate, it seems that Wittgenstein is indicating that there can be no question as to which
objects are connected in what manner. There is no fuzziness with regard to which objects in a
state of affairs have a relation pertaining between them, and which do not. A state of affairs must
be specific in that some object must stand specifically in relation to a particular other or others,
and it must be obvious with which objects the one does not stand in relation. Wittgenstein
presents a visualization of a state of affairs which coincides with this reading of2.031, in the
proposition 2.03
2.03 In a state of affairs, objects fit into one another like links of a chain.
It is implied that a state of affairs is not a collection of links, which might stand in a variety of
relations to one another, but rather a chain in which specific objects stand in relation to specific
others. It is clear which objects are linked, and which are not. The proposition 2.032 goes on to
say that the arrangement of objects in relation forming a state of affairs is the structure of the state
of affairs.
2.032 The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of
the state of affairs.
It has already been seen in the discussion of material and internal properties, that the structure of
a state of affairs is determined by the internal properties of the objects that constitute that state of
affairs. This is echoed in the comment of 2.0 124, that if all objects are given, then all the internal
properties which determine the possibilities of combination for these objects are also given. In
this way, all of the possible states of affairs, or combinations must also be specified.
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.
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In that the proposition 1.1 states that the world is the totality of facts, and proposition 2 that this is
the totality of existing states of affairs, then the totality of objects would have to have all possible
worlds inherent to it. The reverse of this would also be true in terms of the Tractatus, all possible
worlds consist of the various combinations of the totality of objects. The previous discussion has
revealed that it is in the nature of objects to form states of affairs, and that these states of affairs
constitute the world, and indeed, all possible worlds. It must, however, be clarified that
Wittgenstein's view is not that all objects must at any given point in time exist in some
combination, but rather that each object must have the possibility of existing in some combination
at every point in time. This is a subtle distinction, and presents itself in the following
propositions.
2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.
2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
The possibility that an object might form some combination must be in the nature of that object at
all times. This entails that it is not the case that an object has to occur in some state of affairs at
any given point in time. What must be the case is that at all points in time an object must contain
the possibility of occurring in some state of affairs allowed by its internal properties. The subtle
distinction between an object existing in combination at some point in time and having the
possibility offorming a combination at all points in time is of importance in the following way.
If an object did not occur in some combination at one point in time, it could still form a
combination at some other point in time and this combination would still be dependent upon the
internal properties of the object. However, if an object did not have the possibility of occurring in
some state of affairs, then if it did come to exist in combination this would be an accidental
occurrence. The following propositions affirm that this is the view that Wittgenstein purports.
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.
2.0121 It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that
could already exist entirely on its own. If things can occur in states of affairs, this
possibility must be in them from the beginning. (Nothing in the province of logic can be
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merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.) Just
as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside
time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of
combining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot
imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations.
It is stated in these propositions that if the occurrence of an object in a state of affairs were
accidental, then it could not be in the nature of the object to exist in combination with others.
What is implied by these propositions is that if it were not in the nature of an object to come to
exist in combinations with others, and it did come to exist in some combination accidentally, then
it would not be the internal properties of that object that caused it to exist in combination. In
other words, if it were not the nature of objects which allowed combinations to exist, then
whether a combination could exist would depend upon some factor external to the objects
themselves. In that the view of the Tractatus is that the world is mind-independent, whatever this
external factor might be, it must exist in the logical space of the world. In that the substance of
the world is, according to Wittgenstein, simple objects, this external factor must somehow consist
of an object or objects external to those in the relevant state of affairs.
This is immensely helpful in explaining why it is only in the case when the existence of a state of
affairs relies upon nothing more than the internal properties of its constituting objects that the
pictorial relation is capable comparing the sense of the proposition with nothing more than the
portion ofthe world it depicts in such a way that the truth or falsity of the proposition be
determinable. It was argued above that if it were not in the nature of objects to form
combinations, then if a combination were formed, the existence of this state of affairs would rely
upon some factor external to the constituting objects. In that 'sense' has been defined as the truth
condition of a proposition, a proposition representing this state of affairs as its sense would have a
truth condition which goes beyond the depicted situation itself. The truth condition, what would
have to be the case if the proposition were to be true, would have to include whatever factor it
was that allowed for the existence of the depicted state of affairs. It seems, however, that a
proposition presenting this state of affairs as its sense would not depict the factor which allowed
for the existence of the state of affairs. This can be seen because the circumstances resulting from
this external factor being included in the sense of a proposition are not in tune with Wittgenstein's
views on propositions. If this factor were specified in the sense ofthe proposition, then a further
factor would have to be indicated which allowed for the existence of the first factor. This would
fall into a regress which would end only when the totality of objects and how they were arranged
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was indicated in the sense of the proposition. In this case, no proposition could depict just a
single situation, it would have to depict the arrangement of the entire world. This is a prospect
which clearly does not sit comfortably with the views ofthe Tractatus as they have been
propounded. It seems then, that any proposition presenting as its sense a state of affairs whose
existence relied upon some factor external to it would not specify what that factor was. This
would then undermine the ability of the pictorial relation to act as a means of comparison with the
depicted reality of a proposition, such that the truth or falsity of that proposition could be
determined. This would be due to the fact that the truth of the proposition would hinge upon an
unspecified factor, which would not be up for comparison by means of the pictorial relation.
One can sum up this discussion in the following manner. If the pictorial relation is to be able to
serve its purpose of correlating the sense of a proposition with the portion of the world that it
represents such that the truth or falsity of the proposition can be determined, then the sense of a
proposition must be a complete truth condition. If the sense of a proposition is to be a complete
truth condition, then the existence of the state of affairs depicted in that proposition must contain
its own possibility of existence. If the depicted state of affairs is to contain its own possibility of
existence, then whether the state of affairs could possibly exist can depend on nothing more than
the internal properties of the objects that make it up. Thus, it is only under the circumstances in
which the state of affairs depicted by the sense of a proposition contains its own possibility of
existence, in the internal properties of its constituting objects, that the pictorial relation can
correlate the sense of a proposition with the portion of the world that it represents in such a way
that the truth or falsity of the proposition can be determined.
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Chapter 5
This chapter will address a second requirement which must be met if the pictorial relation is to act
as a means of comparison between a proposition and the reality it depicts such that the verity or
falsehood ofthat proposition can be determined. This requirement is that, ifthe truth or falsity of
a proposition is to be determined by comparison of its sense with reality, then no more than one
sense can be represented by a single proposition. This obligation is addressed by Wittgenstein in
terms of what he calls logical multiplicity, which he indicates must be shared by a proposition
and the situation depicted in its sense. It will be argued that the requirement for shared logical
multiplicity indicates that a proposition signify exactly which relations pertain in the situation it
represents as its sense. First, a case will be made that the logical multiplicity of a situation is its
different representational possibilities within a single sign-language. The following section will
contend that it is the relations that pertain in a complex situation that allow for the differing
representations that make up the logical multiplicity of the situation. It will then be argued that
the requirement for shared logical multiplicity between a proposition and the situation represented
as its sense indicates that a proposition must signify exactly which relations pertain in the
situation it represents as its sense. Lastly, it will be put forth that the relations which must be
specified by a proposition can rightfully be considered distinguishable elements of that
proposition.
5.1 Logical multiplicity as representational possibilities
In this section it will be argued that Wittgenstein's notion of logical multiplicity is concerned
with the different representational possibilities of a situation in a single sign-language. Evidence
will be given from the Tractatus that a situation has the possibility of being represented in
multiple ways in a single form of language.
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It is specified in the Tractatus that a proposition and the situation it depicts must have the same
number of distinguishable elements, and therefore, have what Wittgenstein calls the same logical
multiplicity. This constraint presents itself in the proposition 4.04.
4.04 In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that
it represents. The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity.
(Compare Hertz's Mechanics on dynamical models.)
It must first be noted that this statement indicates that Wittgenstein considers mathematical
multiplicity and logical multiplicity to be one in the same thing. As a matter of consistency, the
concept will from here out be referred to as logical multiplicity. Previous exposition has revealed
that a proposition, which is necessarily a picture, does not contain its sense, the situation that it
represents, but only the possibility ofthat sense. Wittgenstein is, therefore, indicating in 4.04 that
a picture or proposition must have the same number of elements as its sense, which must result in
the proposition having the same logical multiplicity as the depicted situation that is its sense.
What this logical multiplicity is, in terms of the Tractatus will be explored in this section. It can
only then be seen how a proposition and the situation depicted by its sense can share the same
number of distinguishable elements.
The statement 4.0411 helps one to begin to understand the concept of logical multiplicity.
4.0411 If, for example, we wanted to express what we now write as '(x).fx' by putting an affix in
front of 'ix' - for instance by writing 'Gen.fx' - it would not be adequate: we should not
know what was being generalized. Ifwe wanted to signalize it with an affix 'g' - for
instance by writing 1{xg), - that would not be adequate either: we should not know the
scope of the generality-sign. Ifwe were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the
argument-places - for instance by writing '(G,G).F(G,G)' - it would not be adequate: we
should not be able to establish the identity of the variables. And so on. All these models of
signifying are inadequate because they lack the necessary mathematical multiplicity.
This statement demonstrates that generalization requires an understanding of all of the possible
occurrences to which a generality applies. For instance, the example GenjX does not indicate
whether the generality sign (Gen) applies to the property for to the individuals x. Due to this
ambiguity, one could not come to an understanding of all instances in which the generality was
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supposed to apply. Similarly, the generalizationj{xg) would not be an appropriate generality,
because one would not be able to establish what the range of items is that might take the place of
x. In this way, one would again, not be able to understand all of the possible occurrences to
which the generality intends to apply. The last generalization, (G,G).F(G,G) also does not allow
this understanding by failing to identify the type of variables. All of these failed examples of
generality are similar in not allowing one to be able to understand the multiplicity of occurrences
to which they might, logically apply. The necessary multiplicity must then refer to the totality of
logically possible instances indicated by a specific symbolism. Logical multiplicity could then be
considered to be the number of logically possible instances for which a statement is applicable.
If, in the context of 4.04, a picture and its depicted reality must have the same logical multiplicity,
then each must be valid for the same number oflogically possible instances. It is not immediately
clear what is meant by the statement that a picture and a situation in reality can be valid for a
certain number of instances. A hint to the meaning is given in the reference to Hertz's dynamical
models. As one can gather from the word 'dynamical,' such a model is changeable, it is
representable in multiple forms 13. Perhaps the logically possible instances referred to above are
the logically possible forms of the representation of a situation. To consider the logical
multiplicity of a situation, either existing in reality or depicted in a picture, to be the number of
logical forms in which it can be represented seems to accord with the nature of sign-languages
presented in chapter one.
A picture, it was said, can be represented in many ways, such as the gramophone record, the score
and the heard symphony referred to in proposition 4.0141. As these various forms of
representation are translatable into one another, so must all the logically possible portrayals
implied by logical multiplicity be translatable. There must exist an internal relation between all
of the possible depictions, such that one can be translated into another. What is more, this
internal relation exists out of necessity, since it is required that translation be possible from any
given sign-language into any other. The proposition 4.014 describes this internal relation as
existing necessarily between various modes of representing the same situation.
4.014 A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand
to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and
13 The thought that models stand in internal relation to one another, such that each is equally a model of all
others which can represent a specific system is attributed to Hertz by Griffin (1964) pages 100- 10 I
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the world. They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern. (Like the two
youths in the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies. They are all in a certain sense
one.)
If one is to consider logical multiplicity to be the totality of logically possible representations of a
situation, then each of these models of the situation must be translatable into any of the others.
The logical multiplicity of a situation, while it may not be identical to the internal relation
between the multiple depictions, is inextricably tied to this internal relation. The logical
multiplicity of a situation is what might be called a property of that situation, a property which is
a necessary aspect of the situation. A situation does not have the possibility of having a logical
multiplicity in one case and not having one in another. Every situation must have a logical
multiplicity inherent to it. The previous discussion of picturing would indicate, then, that logical
multiplicity cannot be picturable. In order to accord with the views of the Tractatus as they have
been laid out, a picture can only capture that which has the possibility of not pertaining; a
description that does not fit logical multiplicity. Logical multiplicity is rather a truth in logical
space, something that always pertains, and therefore, whose existence can only be shown in
language. Confirming this line ofthought is the proposition 4.041.
4.041 This mathematical multiplicity, of course, cannot itself be the subject of depiction. One
cannot get away from it when depicting.
In that logical multiplicity is a necessary part of logical space, there must be different logically
possible representations of any given situation. In the example given in the statement 4.014, one
situation allows a multitude of different representational possibilities. Similarly, it must be
possible to depict any other situation in multiple ways. However, the various modes of
representation cannot refer simply to a translation into each and every valid sign-language, which,
it was said previously, must be possible for every given depiction. If this were the case, every
situation would have the same logical multiplicity, because there will always be the same number
of valid sign-languages. In order that differing multiplicities be possible, there must be multiple
ways of modeling any given situation within a single sign-language.
That it is the case that a single sign-language can allow for numerous representations of any
situation becomes clear in considering Wittgenstein's cryptic reference to idealists and the seeing
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of spatial relations. In proposition 4.0412, it is indicated that the idealist view on spatially
existing situations cannot account for the multiplicity of spatial relations.
4.0412 For the same reason the idealist's appeal to 'spatial spectacles' is inadequate to explain the
seeing of spatial relations, because it cannot explain the multiplicity of these relations.
This statement decidedly requires enlightenment. It is known that the idealist view does not
consider the world to be independent of the mind. Thus, the spatial relations seen could also not
exist independently ofthe mind. Spatial relations are in a way, constructed in the mind of the
viewer. That they are seen depends upon the viewer looking in a particular way, through 'spatial
spectacles.' How Wittgenstein felt this view to not answer for a multiplicity of spatial relations is
not clear. Likewise, it is as yet unclear what a multiplicity of spatial relations might entail.
Assistance in understanding the above proposition comes in the form of another proposition,
namely 5.5423.
5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to one another in
such and such a way. This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of
seeing the figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different
facts. (If! look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b's, then





Whether one sees the a's in front or the b's, results in the seeing of two distinct complexes, two
facts, as Wittgenstein says. To view this complex in two distinct manners is to represent to
oneself the spatial relations existing between the corner-objects, the a's and the b's differently. In
each of these distinct representations, nothing changes about the corner-objects themselves, but
only the manner in which they are seen to be related; the relations have different directional
extensions in space. In this way, the relations themselves are dependent upon the viewer of the
complex. Similarly for the idealists, spatial relations must be observer-relative, since they do not
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exist independent of a mind. Wittgenstein's assertion that spatial relations have a multiplicity
seems to be linked to the view, which he has already been shown to hold, that the world exists
independent of any viewer. If the cube depicted above were to be a physically existent complex
object, then Wittgenstein would have to say that viewing it from one side and then walking
around to view it from the other would not result in seeing two different objects. Rather, one
would be seeing the same object, whose spatial relations appear, then, differently. To advance
this point, consider holding a cube such that two diagonally opposite corners are lined up exactly
with one another. In this case, the cube actually appears as a pyramid. To view the cube as a
pyramid must be an equally valid representation of the spatial relations existing between the
corners. Nothing, however, has changed about the complex object, the cube, which exists
independent of any viewer.
It now seems understandable what Wittgenstein means by the idealists not being able to account
for the multiplicity of spatial relations. Spatial relations appearing differently, for the idealists,
would result in distinct spatial situations. For Wittgenstein a spatial situation exists
independently of any viewer, and thus must have inherent to it the multiplicity of representations
of the spatial relations between its constituents. Each of these representations is equally valid,
since each is logically allowed by the existence of the independent complex.
The consideration ofWittgenstein's view that spatial relations have inherent to them a certain
multiplicity seems to confirm the view that logical multiplicity is indeed concerned with different
representational possibilities within a single sign-language. Evidence given from the Tractatus
indicates that one is not misled in believing that Wittgenstein felt that a situation has the
possibility of being represented in multiple ways in a single form of language.
5.2 Relations and logical multiplicity
This section wi 11 argue that the notion of the logical multiplicity of a situation as its
representational possibilities indicates that it is the relations that pertain between the objects of a
situation that are the most important part of a depiction. It will first be argued that the logical
multiplicity of a situation is not the number of representations possible for it, but the actual
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distinct representations themselves. It will then be argued that it is the relations between the
objects in a complex situation that allow for a multitude of representational possibilities for that
situation.
In the previous section it was indicated that the perspective from which a spatially complex
situation is viewed changes the representation of that situation, but not the situation itself. It
seems that there are infinitely many points of perspective from which any given spatial situation
can be viewed. Thus, if logical multiplicity were considered to be the number of different
representations possible, then the logical multiplicity of every spatial complex would be the same,
in approaching infinity. Such a view would render the notion of logical multiplicity unhelpful for
the purposes ofthe Tractatus. It appears much more useful to consider the logical multiplicity of
a situation to be the multitude of actual representations possible for that situation.
It has just been seen that the logical multiplicity of a spatially complex situation, a cube, is
determined by considering the various ways in which the cube can logically be viewed and
represented. As was indicated, Wittgenstein considered the multiplicity of the different
representations of the cube to be a multiplicity of the relations that pertain between the objects
which make up the cube. Understanding this is of immense importance for appreciating the
significance of the requirement of a shared logical multiplicity for propositions and the situations
they depict.
The preceding exposition of the views put forth in the Tractatus should make it clear that a
proposition or picture presenting a situation is asserting that the objects it depicts stand in certain
specific relations to one another. It is not asserting the existence of the objects themselves. Thus,
the relations that pertain in the cube discussed above are just as important an aspect of the cube as
the objects which make up its corners. It will be contended that it is the relations which pertain in
a spatially complex situation, and not the objects, which influence the logical multiplicity of that
situation.






When the a's are regarded as being in front, the cube appears to be angled to the right. Now, if
this cube were a fixed situation in space, it would be possible to move around the cube in three-
dimensional space, and at certain points, it would appear as if the same cube were angled to the
left. Representations of the cube as angled to the left and to the right would be equally valid.
However, in each representation, nothing changes about the objects, the a's and b's making up its
corners. What changes is how they are seen to relate to one another. What must change with
each and every representation of any spatially complex situation is how the relations between the
objects are portrayed. There are infinitely many perspectives from which any spatial situation
can be viewed, and it is the relations, not the objects, which will appear differently from every
point of view. It is in this way that it can be understood that it is the relations in a spatial situation
which allow that different representations might be possible for that situation.
This example has shown that spatial relations allow for there to be differing representations of
spatial situations, and therefore, a logical multiplicity for each situation. One must consider
whether the same is true of other types of non-spatial relations. The example of musical
representation that Wittgenstein gives in his propositions 4.014 and 4.0141 is a helpful one, for
the notes of music stand in relation to one another in a non-spatial manner. An enlightening
instance of notes having relations pertain to them is to consider a scale, take for example the
minor pentatonic scale. A pentatonic scale is a series consisting of a repetition of 5 different
tones or notes, such as the series of notes C D#/P F G A#/Bb C. It is up for consideration
whether the relations that pertain between these notes influence the logical multiplicity of the
musical situation presented by the series.
That it is the case that the relations influence the logical multiplicity is pointed to by the notion of
musical transposition. The above series of notes can be transposed in to many different keys,
such as the key ofB, given by the series of notes B 0 E F#/Gb A B. What allows this to be an
equally valid representation of the minor pentatonic scale is that the notes stand in the same
relation to one another as in the first series presented. In each case, the series of notes is the
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embodiment of a certain series of steps up the chromatic scale. The note C stands to D#/Eb in the
same relation that B stands to D, namely, that the latter of each pair is one and a half steps up the
chromatic scale from the former. The series of steps carries on from one and a half steps to one
step, followed by another full step, one and a half steps from that point and then another one step
up the scale. Thus the series of notes C D#/Eb F GM/Bb C, as well as every other transposition
of this, is the embodiment ofthe series 1 Y2, 1,1,1 Y2, 1 steps up the chromatic scale. Similarly, if
a note in one octave is considered a distinct 'object' from the same note in a different octave, then
the relations between the notes in this series allow that it can validly be represented in the sign-
language of written notes by the same series in all possible octaves. Any series of notes standing
in the given sequence of relations to one another must be a valid representation of the minor
pentatonic scale in the single sign-language of written notes. This example has shown that the
non-spatial relations found in a musical situation allow for different possible representations, and
thus, for a logical multiplicity of this non-spatial complex situation.
Examples of both spatial and non-spatial situations have been given, and it has been demonstrated
that in each form of situation, a differing number of representations are made possible by the
relations that pertain in the situations. While the logical multiplicity of each situation is not the
number of valid representations of that situation, but the actual different depictions possible, this
logical multiplicity is a result of relations pertaining between the objects in each situation.
5.3 Shared multiplicity and a single sense
In this section it will be argued that the requirement for shared logical multiplicity between a
proposition and the situation represented as its sense indicates that a proposition must signify
exactly which relations pertain in the situation it represents as its sense. Only in this way will it
be possible for a proposition to represent no more than one sense, such that the truth or falsity of
the proposition can be determined through the comparison of its sense with reality via the
pictorial relation.
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One is brought to the discussion of what must be shared by a proposition and the situation which
is its sense because of the assertion made by Wittgenstein, that a proposition does not contain its
sense. The proposition 3.13, addressed in chapter two, indicated that a proposition contains only
the possibility of representing its sense, though it does not contain the sense itself. The
proposition 3.12 indicates that a proposition is a sign, which can represent a sense, when the
proposition stands in correlation to the world via the pictorial relation.
3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. - And a proposition is
a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
What Wittgenstein says must be shared between the propositional sign and the situation depicted
by the sense ofthat proposition is logical multiplicity. As the first section of this chapter
revealed, logical multiplicity can be read to be the different possible representations of a situation
within a single sign-language. Thus, to say that the sign of a proposition and the situation
depicted by the sense of that proposition must have the same logical multiplicity, as Wittgenstein
does, is to say that both must indicate the exact same possible representations. This seems an
obvious consequence of the desire, expressed throughout the Tractatus, that a proposition
indicate, through its sense, a specific situation which might pertain in reality.
However, the exploration ofthe notion of logical multipl icity uncovered a further requirement
which must be placed on situations which share this multiplicity. It was argued in the second
section ofthis chapter that it is the relations pertaining in a situation that allow for the different
representations that make up the logical multiplicity of the situation. Therefore, it seems that
requiring that the propositional sign and the situation depicted by the sense of that proposition
have the same possible representations demands that each indicates the exact same relations to
pertain between the objects in the possible situation. The result of this reading of logical
multiplicity is that the sign of a proposition must, somehow, determine which exact relations
pertain in the situation represented by its sense.
Evidence that this reading is not far off of what Wittgenstein must have believed comes from the
discussion of generalized propositions. Any proposition that did not present a specific relation
pertaining in its sense could at best only present a variable of which the particular relation could
be one instance. This idea was put forth in the proposition 3.315 discussed in chapter three,
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which stated that when one ofthe parts of a proposition is replaced with a variable, one is left
with a class of propositions of the same form. A generalized proposition, in this way, is incapable
of representing a sense, which must be a specific situation in logical space. It can contain only
the possibility of representing several senses of the same form. One again reaches the conclusion
that if a proposition is to present a single sense, then the exact relations to pertain in the sense of
that proposition must be represented in order that the proposition not be of a generalized form.
5.4 Relations as distinguishable elements
This section will argue that the relations which the previous section indicated must be specified
by propositions, are distinguishable elements of those propositions. As this indicates that these
relations must have reference in reality, objections to such a view will be discussed. It will then
be argued that these objections pose no difficulties for the reading of the Tractatus that has been
gIven.
In so far as the specific relations pertainjng in the possible situation which is the sense of a
proposition must, somehow, be specified in the propositional sign, these relations are an integral
part of the truth-condition ofa proposition. It must be possible, given this reading of the
Tractatus, to determine that a proposition is false if the same objects that it represents stand in a
relation different to the relation depicted in the proposition. In this way, the relations which
pertain in a situation must, on this reading of logical multiplicity, be considered distinguishable
elements in the situation.
The explanation of logical multiplicity above already began to hint at the conclusion that relations
are distinguishable elements in a situation when it indicated that the same relations can be held by
different sets of objects. The example given in the previous section of different sets of musical
notes being able to hold the same relations is a case in point. Spatial relations, examples of which
abound in the Tractatus, are similarly capable of being held by distinct sets of objects. A chair
and a table can stand in a spatial relation of being one meter distant from one another, as can two
human beings. Given the proposition that two specified human beings are standing one meter
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apart from one another, it must be possible to discriminate between the two human beings and the
spatial relation of one meter. The proposition must be equally false if either of the two human
beings is not a part of the corresponding situation in reality, or if the relation is different from the
one specified, say one and a half meters rather than the indicated one. In that each of these
elements can be scrutinized independently of the others, they are distinguishable elements. Each
part of the potential situation presented by a proposition, including the relation asserted to pertain,
must be correlated with reality via the pictorial relation. That Wittgenstein felt that each element
of a picture corresponds via the pictorial relation is indicated in the proposition 2.1514.
2.1514 The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with things.
The inference to be made here is that the relations presented in the potential situations signified
by propositions have counterparts in reality, in order that the truth or falsity of propositions be
determinable. It is argued by Peter Carruthers that the fact that a relation might have a reference
in the world raises a difficulty with regard to what that reference might be. 14 In brief, he raises
objections to both the possibility that what correspond to reality might be a specific instance of a
relation and the possibility that the reference be a general relation. He notes that if what was to
be correlated with the world were a specific instantiation of a relation, then if that relation did not
exist in reality, then a proposition representing it would not refer to anything. Ifthis were the
case, then a proposition could not be false while retaining a meaning. In chapter two it was
already indicated that the Tractatus requires that a picture, and therefore, a proposition must have
the possibility of representing falsely, while still having meaning. If a relation presented in a
proposition were to be a general relation, Carruthers argues that this relation might exist
independently of the objects between which it pertains at any given moment. In this case, if it
were to pertain between two objects, another relation would be required to relate the relation and
those objects. If this second relation, in turn, were also to be of a general nature, then yet another
relation would be necessary to relate it to the objects and the other relation, threatening a
regress 15. If, on the other hand, this second relation were to be a specific instantiation of a
relation, one would be left in the first quandary described.
14 Carruthers (1989) pages 160-161
15 This seems to be an example of Bradley's regress, well described in Hylton (1990) pages 48-49
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While the critique offered by Carruthers appears valid for the instances it describes, it does not
seem to present any difficulty to the Tractatus as it has been portrayed. As it has been argued that
one relation might be held by different sets of objects, the critique offered against relations as
particular instantiations does not seem to apply. The relations which might act as a reference in
the world for tractarian propositions are closer to the general types of relations discussed above.
However, there is no indication that a relation, even of a general type must have the possibility of
existing independently of the objects between which it pertains. As states of affairs were
described in chapter four, the relations which pertain in them are solely manifestations of the
internal properties of the objects which make up the states of affairs. Relations come into
existence because of the natures of the objects amongst which they pertain, they do not have a
separate existence. This in no way precludes a relation from having the possibility of being held
by a distinct set of objects, so long as it is in the natures of those objects to hold this relation. In
that the Tractatus does not indicate, and indeed points to the contrary, that relations have the
possibility of existing independently of the objects between which they pertain, the tractarian
relations are not threatened by a Bradleyan regress.
To consider relations as having reference in the world raises no specific difficulties for this
reading of the Tractatus. Thus the case remains solid that the Tractatus, as it has been presented,
requires relations to be distinguishable elements in a proposition. In being distinguishable
elements of a proposition, the demand remains that a proposition must specify which exact
relations pertain in the situation presented as its sense.
Summary
There are two goals that I hope part two of this thesis has achieved. Firstly, I believe part two to
have demonstrated that the Tractatus answers to the demands which must be met if the pictorial
relation is to act as a means of comparison between a proposition and reality, such that the truth
or falsity of that proposition is determinable. Secondly, I hope to have shown that a unique
reading of logical multiplicity is both possible and insightful in terms of the Tractatus.
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With regards to the first goal mentioned above, two lines of argument in chapter four answer to
the demand that for the determination of the truth or falsity of a proposition, the sense of that
proposition be correlated with nothing more than its depicted situation in reality, such that the
pictorial relation can serve its purpose. The first section gave the requirement for simple objects
as Wittgenstein's resolution to the problem that the sense of a proposition might depend upon the
truth or falsity of another proposition. The second section put forth that the account of simple
objects given in the Tractatus allows that a state of affairs depicted in the sense of a proposition
contain its own possibility of existence, so that the sense of a proposition must be correlated with
nothing more than the appropriate state of affairs in reality in order to determine the truth or
falsity ofthe proposition. Chapter five accomplished the objective of demonstrating that if a
proposition is to represent no more than one sense, such that the truth or falsity of a proposition
can be determinable by the correlation of its sense with reality via the pictorial relation, then the
exact relations which pertain in the situation depicted in the sense of a proposition must somehow
be signified in the propositional sign.
Regarding the second aim of part two of this thesis, I believe chapter five to have provided
sufficient evidence that one is justified in giving an alternative reading of the tractarian notion of
logical multiplicity as the distinct representations possible for a situation in a single sign-
language. This reading highlights the central role that relations play in both the states of affairs in
reality and in those presented as the senses of propositions. It also indicates first, the need to
count these relations as distinguishable elements in a situation and second, that to do so is
unproblematic for the text. I feel that the advantage of this reading is that it delineates the
demands that the text places on itself, and points to how these demands might be met, rather than
attempting to unify a reading of the work based on pre-established views on the status of objects.
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Part 3
Parts one and two have established what the demands are that the Tractatus places on itself. Part
three of this thesis will be concerned with the implications that these demands have for the work.
Chapter six will handle the topic of whether the Tractatus is able to meet the requirement that a
proposition depict exactly which relations pertain in the situation represented in its sense. The
conclusion will be reached that the Tractatus cannot meet its own demands, for the work does not
lend an account by which elementary propositions, to which all propositions must be analyzable,
can represent specific relations. In chapter seven it will be explored what the implications of the
demand for the specification of relations in a propositional sign are for the conception of
elementary propositions as independent of one another. It will be argued that there are an infinite
number of relations which must be representable in elementary propositions, and that these
relations can be mutually exclusive in nature. This brings about the result that the elementary
propositions which represent these relations cannot be independent. It will then be argued that
the non-independence of elementary propositions results in the inability to display logical
necessity, which an account of independent elementary propositions allowed for. The final
thought in this section is that the conception of elementary propositions as non-independent
introduces the idea that there is an alternative mode of description for the world to the one given
in the Tractatus, one that is more suited to the aims of the work.
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Chapter 6
This chapter will revolve around the issue of if and how the Tractatus meets the requirement,
specified in chapter five, that a proposition depict exactly which relations pertain in the situation
represented in its sense. The first concern will be to give Wittgenstein's account of propositions
as analyzable into elementary propositions, which consist of no more than names in immediate
combination. It will then be argued that elementary propositions are incapable of representing the
infinity of distinguishable relations with spatial relations between the names it presents. The final
section will argue that to account for the specification of relations by considering relations
amongst the simple objects of the world does not accord with the views of the Tractatus as they
have been presented. The conclusion to be drawn from this chapter must be that, in so far as the
Tractatus has been portrayed as requiring of itself that the specific relations pertaining in states of
affairs be representable in a propositional sign, the work is unable to meet its own demands.
6.1 The analysis of propositions
This section will act as an exposition of Wittgenstein's views on propositions. This exposition
will be the starting point from which to discover whether the tractarian conception of propositions
is capable of meeting the requirement uncovered in chapter five, that a proposition must
somehow depict the relations contained in the situation which is its sense. It will be shown that
the Tractatus conceives of propositions as representing potentially complex situations. It will
then be put forth that these composite propositions are analyzable into elementary propositions.
It will then be revealed that the tractarian characterization of elementary propositions indicates
that they are no more than combinations of names.
The account of propositions given up to this point has described propositions as pictures of
reality. The tractarian view of the purpose of a picture, which must be likewise for a proposition,
is given in the statement of2.11.
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2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of
affairs.
It has also been seen that a proposition presents possible states of affairs through its having a
sense. The discussion of the 'sense'-'reference' distinction revealed that the sense ofa
proposition cannot represent anything other than a situation in logical space, it cannot simply
assert the existence of objects, it must indicate that the objects it portrays stand in relation to one
another. It must also be remembered that a proposition, as was revealed in the last chapter, only
contains a sign, which has the possibility of expressing its sense. Evidence exists to support the
view that a proposition can represent a sense because it has the possibility of expressing a
situation which might or might not pertain in the world. Taken in combination, propositions 3.14
and 3.142 indicate that it is through a propositional sign, which is a fact, not simply a collection
of names, that a proposition can have the possibility of representing a sense.
3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a
determinate relation to one another. A propositional sign is a fact.
3.142 Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.
Given that a sense is a possible state of affairs that might exist in reality, a propositional sign, in
expressing a sense, must have its elements related in such a way that they represent the objects of
reality standing in some logically possible state of affairs. It is asserted that names in and of
themselves cannot express a sense. While names must refer to objects in the world, a sense
expresses that the objects referred to by names exist in a possible state of affairs through these
names being related in a specific and determinate fashion.
In the manner that propositions have been portrayed thus far, it has been said that they must
present situations, however, it has not indicated what the level of complexity of situations that can
be depicted is. As the statement 2.11 implies, a picture and thus a proposition can represent more
than just a single state of affairs. It seems that the situations represented by propositions can
include multiple states of affairs, more complex situations. That this might be the case is also
indicated by the proposition 3.24 discussed previously. It states that a proposition can represent a
complex, and that the structure of a proposition representing a complex stands in internal relation
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to the structure of a proposition concerning a constituent of that complex. In saying that a
constituent of a complex situation can likewise be represented in a proposition indicates that this
constituent is itself a situation, for otherwise it would not be possible to depict it in a proposition.
The implication of this discussion is that Wittgenstein must have felt his propositions to be
analyzable into propositions representing less complex situations. This is supported by his
statement that there is a certain group of propositions which he considers to be the simplest
possible propositions. Those are what he calls elementary propositions in the statement 4.21.
4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state
of affairs.
In order to be consistent with the contention of the Tractatus, that a proposition can only present
one sense, Wittgenstein would have to say that any proposition subject to analysis into one or
more elementary propositions could only have one final analysis. A proposition representing a
complex cannot, in keeping with the principles of the Tractatus, potentially be analyzed into
different sets of elementary propositions. If this were the case, the composite proposition could
be ultimately analyzed into distinct sets of elementary propositions, presenting different states of
affairs, and, thereby, allowing that the composite proposition could represent different senses. If
a proposition can express only a single sense, as required, it can only have one ultimate analysis,
and the statement 3.25 confirms this.
3.25 A proposition has one and only one complete analysis
Upon analysis of a composite proposition, one must be left with a single set of the simplest
possible propositions, elementary propositions. It seems that through these elementary
propositions, in that they represent states of affairs, the objects which stand in combination with
one another must be presented. Proposition 3.201 suggests that a proposition presenting these
simple objects must be one of the ultimately simple propositions, an elementary proposition.
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3.201 I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition 'completely analysed.'
It must, however, be confirmed that Wittgenstein intended the simple signs that he referred to
here to act as representatives of objects in elementary propositions. Decisive evidence for this is
found in the propositions 3.202 and 3.22, in combination.
3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.
3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.
It should be clear that Wittgenstein felt that it is through elementary propositions that the world is
ultimately represented. This accords with his view that the world consists of states of affairs,
which find representation in elementary propositions. Thus, it must be elementary propositions
which have to meet the requirement, given previously, that a proposition must depict the relations
contained in the situation depicted by its sense. For this reason, the characterization that
Wittgenstein gives of elementary propositions is of central importance to the Tractatus. It is in
the proposition 4.22 that Wittgenstein gives his most complete description of elementary
propositions.
4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.
Elementary propositions, it is asserted, consist solely of combinations of names. It must be seen
if and how such an elementary proposition is capable of representing which exact relations
pertain in the situation depicted by its sense.
72
6.2 The representation of relations
The task of this section is to ascertain whether the requirement that relations in elementary
propositions be specified can be met by these relations being represented by relations between
words rather than with words themselves. It will be argued that this account is insufficient to
meet the demands of shared logical multiplicity given in this reading of the Tractatus.
The view that the relations between the objects of reality are represented by relations pertaining
between the names in an elementary proposition is one supported by, amongst others, Irving Copi
and Elizabeth Anscombe l6 . In short, the position is that any relation between objects in reality
can be represented by some spatial relation pertaining between the names representing those
objects in elementary propositions. This clearly seems to be the view propounded in the
Tractatus, as made obvious in the proposition 4.0311, which explains the construction of an
elementary proposition.
4.0311 One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one
another. In this way the whole group--like a tableau vivant-presents a state of affairs.
Wittgenstein makes it just as clear in the proposition 3.1431 that it is spatial relations amongst
names that represent the relations between objects in reality.
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of
spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial
arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.
Both ofthe above propositions appear to make known that names only have the possibility of
standing in spatial relations to one another, and these relations will represent the relations of
reality. Therefore, the arrangement of the names 'a' and' b' in the form \ might be said to
represent the situation that a is on top of b. All relations amongst objects in reality must, in other
words, be representable by the spatial arrangements of names, whether the actual relations
themselves are spatial in type or not. That it might be the case that a spatial relation between
16 See Copi (1958) and Anscombe (1959).
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names could represent a non-spatial relation in reality does not disagree with the doctrines of the
Tractatus. In chapter three it was discussed that the signs used in propositions have arbitrarily
determined meanings. It follows that the representations of relations might also have their
meanings determined arbitrarily, such that a certain spatial relation could be said to stand for a
certain other non-spatial relation in the world.
What does seem to pose a problem for the Tractatus, it will be argued, is that the spatial
arrangements of names cannot account for the infinity of relations that might pertain in reality.
The thought behind this is that the representation of each specific relation that might pertain in
reality must be distinguishable from all others such that a proposition can make known which
exact relations pertain in the situation it represents. Again, this is the demand of logical
multiplicity.
One might contend that it could indeed be possible to represent all relations spatially, that one
would not require an infinity of spatial arrangements to do so. The argument might be that since
the relations that pertain between objects are a result of the internal properties of objects, which
objects are represented, taken along with their spatial arrangement, would indicate the exact
relations that pertain. It will be argued that this cannot be the case, since objects must have the
possibility of holding different relations, if the world of which objects are the substance is to be
limited, as it is asserted in the Tractatus.
It will first be argued that if the world is to be limited, then anyone object must have it in its
nature to hold an infinity of distinct relations of the same type. A spatial example is most useful
to this end. Consider that a cube can have many different dimensions, for example, its sides
could have a length of three centimeters, four centimeters, twenty meters, etc. Any object which
has the possibility of occurring in a cube must be able to hold a straight spatial relation of any
given length to any other object which can similarly occur in a cube. It must be possible for each
object to have relations of different length pertaining to it for the following reason. If an object
could only hold a spatial relation of a specific length, then every cube of a different dimension
must consist of a different set of objects, which allow for the relation of that specific length. The
possibilities for different cube dimensions approaches infinity, which would have to result in
there being infinitely many objects in the world. This does not accord with the assertion in the
Tractatus that the world is a limited whole, as established in chapter two. Further, it cannot be
said that it is possible for the dimensions of a cube to approach infinity only in a scale
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representation of reality, but not in reality itself. This would have to require that there be objects,
which might hold relations of length approaching infinity, which can possibly occur in pictures,
but which cannot be found in reality. This would be disallowed, for such objects occurring in a
picture would have no reference in the world, and the picture would not have the possibility of
representing falsely. The argument here is the same as that presented in chapter five against the
possibility of a specific instantiation of a relation being that which corresponds to reality. The
conclusion to be drawn from the above argument is that any object which might occur in a spatial
complex, such as a cube, must be able to have spatial relations of differing lengths pertain to it.
It is not a stretch to apply the same argument to objects of the non-spatial variety. While not an
ideal example of a non-spatial object, a musical note is again, a helpful example. If C can stand
to DIl/Eb in a relation of one and a half steps up the chromatic scale, it is necessarily also able to
stand in relation of two and a half steps up the scale to F. One must be drawn to the conclusion
that there are infinitely many relations, of both spatial and non-spatial character, which require
distinguishable representation in elementary propositions. The problem for the Tractatus is that
this infinity of distinguishable relations is simply not representable in the limited symbolism of
spatial relations between names in an elementary proposition. Such a symbolism might be able to
account for different types of relations, for example a b representing' a' being separated from
'b', and perhaps even a b representing that 'a' and 'b' are separated by a greater distance
than a b. However, it is infeasible that such a symbolism be able to account for the infinity of
relations which require distinguishable representation. Thus, the account of relations as
representable by spatial relations in elementary propositions does not meet the demands that a
shared logical multiplicity places on these propositions.
6.3 Do tractarian objects include relations?
In this section the other possibility open to the Tractatus for the representation of relations in
elementary propositions will be explored. The alternative possibility for the representation of
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relations is that the objects of the Tractatus might include relations
17
, such that these relations can
be specified in an elementary proposition through the names that it presents. It will be argued
that to consider relations to be objects does not accord with the doctrines of the Tractatus as they
have been advocated in this reading.
It has been widely argued that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, does not admit that relations might
be considered objects. Amongst the proponents of such a view are, again Copi and Anscombe,
James Griffin, Peter Carruthers, Wilfred Sellars and Yiwei Zheng l8 all of whom give compelling
arguments for this point of view. Each of these authors relies heavily on textual evidence, often
from sources outside of the Tractatus itself. While such an approach has tremendous value, this
section will be concerned simply with demonstrating that to consider relations as objects does not
fit the reading of the Tractatus given in this thesis.
Again, the thought is that if relations are objects, then they can be named and if they can be
named, then they can be represented in elementary propositions by simple signs. In this regard, it
will be helpful to look at Wittgenstein's notion of a simple sign, in order to determine whether it
would be appropriate to consider that a relation might be represented by one. Proposition 3.23
lends valuable insight.
3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be
determinate.
The requirement that 'sense' be determinate is addressed in the first section of chapter four. In
brief, to require that 'sense' be determinate is to say that the sense of one proposition cannot
depend upon the truth or falsity of any other proposition. In order to meet this condition,
Wittgenstein argued for the existence of simple objects to form the substance of the world. This
understanding is helpful for the reading of 3.23. If Wittgenstein believes that simple signs allow
17 The idea that relations might be considered objects goes against the Fregean distinction between object
and concept, for a relation on Frege's view falls into the concept category. This view is given in his work
'On Concept and Object' (1892). See Geach (1952) pages 42-55.
18 Zheng offers an interesting resolution, that relations, while not objects, are modes of configurations of
objects in elementary propositions. This view does not fit in with the reading of the Tractatus given here,
as this reading does not acknowledge modes of configuration, but rather insists that the occurrence of a
relation in a situation is wholly dependent upon the natures of the objects between which it pertains. See
Zheng (1999).
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for the determinacy of 'sense,' as is clearly stated here, then he must feel that simple signs are the
representatives ofthe simple objects which form the substance of the world.
Given this, there are two arguments to show that the idea of a relation as making up part ofthe
substance of the world does not easily fit with the views of the Tractatus as they have been
propounded. The first concerns the appreciation of the fact that this reading of the Tractatus
requires that there be infinitely many distinctly representable relations. If relations were simple
objects, the result would have to be that there would be infinitely many simple objects forming
the substance of the world. This idea does not sit comfortably with the tractarian conception of
the world as a limited whole, as described in chapter two.
The second, and more powerful argument centers on Wittgenstein's views on the nature of the
ultimately simple objects of the world. It can be remembered from chapter four that the tractarian
conception of simple objects is that they are in possession of internal properties, which determine
the relations that they might hold. If relations were simple objects, then they must similarly have
internal properties determining the combinations in which they might occur. This does not
accord well with the idea that has been presented multiple times, that a relation's pertaining
between objects is dependent upon nothing more than the natures of the relevant objects. If a
relation itself had internal properties influencing its occurrence in combinations, it would have a
character on par with the objects between which it pertains. In this way, it appears that if
relations were simple objects, containing internal properties just as the simple objects described
previously do, then these relations must have an existence independent of those objects between
which they pertain. Evidence in the Tractatus confirms that Wittgenstein would have to hold this
to be true of relations as simple objects, making up the substance of the world. Consider
proposition 2.024.
2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.
According to this statement, relations as substance would have to exist in the world as distinct
entities, independent of whether they occurred in combination at any given moment in time. In
other words, relations would have to exist outside of any combination. This idea is in direct
conflict with the view that has been attributed to the Tractatus in chapters four and five, that a
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relation does not have an existence independent of the objects between which it pertains, for it is
a manifestation of the internal properties of the objects which hold it.
While it is admitted that these arguments are not conclusive, they do stand to show that an
account of relations as simple objects cannot with any ease be made to fit into the reading of the
Tractatus that has been given in this thesis. This view cannot, then, be taken to account for the
specification of relations in a propositional sign, which, it was said in chapter five, is required.
Neither is the account of relations representing relations given in the previous section able to
meet the requirement that specific relations be signified. One is left with the result that the




This chapter will explore the bearing that the requirement that a proposition depict exactly which
relations pertain in the situation represented in its sense has on the tractarian conception of
elementary propositions as independent. The first section, in giving an account of elementary
propositions as independent, will highlight the importance that independent elementary
propositions have in the Tractatus, namely that they allow that logical necessity can be displayed.
It will then be argued that the demand that exact relations be specified in a propositional sign
precludes elementary propositions from independence, thereby preventing logical necessity from
being displayed in the manner that Wittgenstein hoped. It will be concluded that reading the
Tractatus as making the demands it does for the representation of relations reveals that it is both
possible and useful to describe the world in terms of degree.
7.1 The tractarian view of independent elementary propositions
The task of this section will be to present the tractarian stance on elementary propositions as
independent of one another. Support will first be given that Wittgenstein intended elementary
propositions to be independent. It will then be explained that Wittgenstein's notion of
independence for elementary propositions entails that they cannot contradict one another.
Further, it will be put forth that in their being independent, elementary propositions allow for
logical necessity to be shown through a truth table formed of all possible truth-functions with
elementary propositions as their truth-arguments.
In the proposition 5.152 Wittgenstein introduces the notion of the independence of propositions
by defining that two propositions are independent when they share no truth-arguments.
5.152 When propositions have no truth-arguments in common with one another, we call them
independent of one another. Two elementary propositions give one another the probability
of Yz. IfP follows from q, then the proposition 'q' gives to the proposition 'p' the
probability 1. The certainty of logical inference is a limiting case of probability.
(Application of this to tautology and contradiction.)
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The second sentence oftms statement indicates that if one elementary proposition exists, then any
other elementary proposition will have a fifty-fifty chance of existence; the existence ofthe
second elementary proposition has the probability given to it by pure chance. In this way, one
elementary proposition being true does not influence the truth or falsity of any other elementary
proposition. While this seems an unequivocal statement of the independence of elementary
propositions, it will be seen that other propositions in the Tractatus point to elementary
propositions meeting the definition given in the first sentence of 5.152. The following statements
support this definition.
5 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition
is a truth-function of itself.)
5.01 Elementary propositions are the truth-arguments of propositions.
In combination, the propositions 5 and 5.01 lend the following insight into the tractarian
description of elementary propositions. If an elementary proposition is a truth-argument, then, in
being a truth-function of itself, anyone elementary proposition has only itself as its single truth-
argument. In other words, Wittgenstein seemed to believe that any elementary proposition can
have only a single truth-argument, and that is itself. In this way, no two elementary propositions
can share the same truth-argument. One is brought to the conclusion, given the statement of
5.152, that ifno two elementary propositions can share a truth-argument, then each elementary
proposition is independent of any other.
Evidence stands in the Tractatus that Wittgenstein believed independence to entail that
elementary propositions cannot exclude one another. While it is a difficult proposition to
understand, 6.3751 offers guidance on Wittgenstein's view on the subject of the independence
and non-contradictory nature of elementary propositions.
6.3751 For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field
is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of
colour. Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows-a
particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, particles that are in
different places at the same time cannot be identical. (It is clear that the logical product of
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two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement
that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)
The parenthetical remark made at the end is a useful starting point in the unraveling of this
statement. Wittgenstein says that two statements, the first that a point in the visual field has one
colour at one point in time and the second that the same point in the visual field has another color
at the same point in time contradict one another; one excludes the possibility ofthe other. He
also states that two elementary propositions cannot form a contradiction. The conclusion is that
neither of the two statements given above concerning the colour of a point in the visual field is an
elementary proposition in Wittgenstein's eyes. In so far as he does not believe statements
regarding colour to be elementary, Wittgenstein does indicate that such statements can, in the
end, be analyzed into statements concerning the physical structure which determines colour. It
seems that analysis must reveal the structure of a situation which can exist or not independently
of any other situation, and that it is these independent situations which are represented by
elementary propositions.
In so far as a situation represented by an elementary proposition can exist or not exist
independently of any other situation, it cannot exclude the existence of any other equally
elementary situation. Such considerations seem to have led Wittgenstein to his statement that
elementary propositions cannot contradict one another
4.211 It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition
contradicting it.
That no elementary proposition can have a contrary, is a direct consequence ofthe requirement
that elementary propositions be independent.
While it has been shown that Wittgenstein felt elementary propositions to be independent of one
another, and therefore, cannot contradict one another, it is now up for consideration why it is that
Wittgenstein held this belief. It will be argued that the demand for independent elementary
propositions is a result of the tractarian notion of logical necessity as that which can be shown but
not stated. It will be most useful to begin by noting that according to the Tractatus the totality of
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true elementary propositions composes a complete description of the world. This is given in
proposition 4.26.
4.26 If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the
world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and
adding which of them are true and which false.
The second sentence of 4.26 implies that one can follow this thought through to say that if all
possible elementary propositions are given, then these contain the possibility of describing any
possible world composed of the same substance. The totality of elementary propositions entails
the totality of possible ways in which the world as a limited whole can be constructed. The case
will be made that it is through there being a totality of elementary propositions that Wittgenstein
felt that logical necessity can be shown.
First, it must be noted that in Wittgenstein's view, the only necessity to exist is logical necessity.
He puts this idea forth in his proposition 6.375.
6.375 Just as the only necessity that exists is LogicaL necessity, so too the only impossibility that
exists is LogicaL impossibility.
It must be remembered from chapter one, that logic is a reflection of that in the world which is
subject to law and these laws cannot be stated in language because they do not have the
possibility of not being the case, which is a requirement for something to be picturable and
therefore, sayable. Logical necessity, therefore, must be something which Wittgenstein felt could
only be shown. That this is the case is reflected in Wittgenstein's assertion that logical necessity
is shown through tautology. Taken in combination, the propositions 6.1 and 4.464 expose this
view.
6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies.
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4.464 A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible.
(Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in
the theory of probability.)
Logical propositions, in other words, are guaranteed of their truth; they are a reflection of
necessity in the world. It can now be seen how logical necessity can be shown, given the totality
of elementary propositions l9 . As it was ascertained above, given the totality of elementary
propositions, one is also given all of their possible combinations, all possible truth-functions with
elementary propositions as their bases. The totality of possible truth-functions of elementary
propositions, which can be displayed in a truth-table, entails the description of all possible
worlds. The description of all possible worlds is a result of all possible assignments of truth-
values to all of the possible combinations of elementary propositions. It must be emphasized that
it is only possible to assign truth-values in every possible combination, thereby giving the
description of every possible world, because the truth-value of anyone elementary proposition
does not influence the truth-value of any other elementary proposition. However, given the
assignment of every possible combination of truth-values to elementary propositions, there might
be certain combinations of elementary propositions forming certain truth-functions, which are
true for all assignments of truth-values, in all possible worlds. These are the tautologies that
display logical necessity.
The important point to be made here is that it is the independence of elementary propositions that
allows for the representation of all possible worlds. It is because of the fact that the truth-value of
one elementary proposition does not influence the truth-value of any other, that it is possible to
assign truth-values in every possible combination to the totality of elementary propositions.
Further, it is only through the representation of all possible worlds that logical necessity can be
shown. In other words, if it is going to be possible to show logical necessity through a truth-table
formed of all possible truth-functions with elementary propositions as their truth-arguments, then
there must be elementary propositions which are independent.
19 This argument is a reflection of the views of Carruthers and Griffin. Carruthers argues that the need to
display logical truths is a motivation for the requirement of the independence of elementary propositions.
See Carruthers (1990) pages 127-130. Griffin argues that Wittgenstein insisted that one must be able to
analyze all propositions to the point of independent elementary propositions, such that the structures of the
situations represented by their senses do not stand in internal relations to one another. See Griffin (1964)
pages 84-86.
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7.2 The non-independence of elementary propositions
It will be the purpose ofthis section to argue that the reading of the Tractatus given in this thesis
does not allow for logical necessity to be displayed in the fashion described in the previous
section. The first contention in this regard is that the infinity of relations which might pertain
between the objects in states of affairs can exclude one another, resulting in the non-
independence of elementary propositions which represent states of affairs. This will be shown to
prevent the representation of all possible worlds in a truth-table, which in turn disallows that
logical necessity can be displayed in the manner described in the last section. The final point will
be that while this reading ofthe Tractatus does not allow necessity to be shown in the way
Wittgenstein hoped, it does lend the insight that it is possible and useful to describe the world in
terms of degree.
The discussions in chapters five and six revealed that in requiring that specific relations be
displayed as distinguishable elements by a propositional sign, there are infinitely many
distinguishable relations, which must be representable. This case is well illustrated by spatial
relations, which might be represented in an elementary proposition. There must, according to this
reading, be different elementary propositions representing the objects 'a' and 'b' standing in a
relation of three centimeters from one another, three and a half centimeters, twenty kilometers,
etc. In that there are infinitely many relations to be represented, there are infinitely many
elementary propositions which can possibly be true. However, the truth of one of these
elementary propositions must exclude the truth of at least some of the infinity of other elementary
propositions. When one asserts that the objects'a' and'b' stand in a relation ofthree
centimeters, one is equally saying that they do not stand in a relation offour centimeters, twenty
kilometers or any other spatial distance. Another way of looking at this is that the structure of an
elementary proposition presenting as its sense the objects 'a' and 'b' standing in a relation of
three centimeters, stands in internal relation to the structures of the elementary propositions
presenting as their senses the objects'a' and' b' standing in all other spatial relations. It is in
virtue of the fact that the structures of these elementary propositions stand in internal relation to
one another that the truth of one can exclude the truth of all others. In this way, elementary
propositions representing specific relations cannot be independent of one another, the truth-value
of one does affect the truth-values of others.
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Nonetheless, it must still be the case that one can have a complete picture of the world, given the
totality of true elementary propositions. It will be argued that while it is the case that the totality
of all true elementary propositions at any given point in time provides a complete picture of the
world at that point in time, it is not possible on this reading to form a truth-table of all the
possible combinations of logically connected elementary propositions. Such a truth-table would
display all possible worlds. The ability to form such a truth-table rests upon a totality of
elementary propositions, which might be either true or false at any point in time, being given. As
it was claimed earlier, this reading of the Tractatus requires an infinity of elementary
propositions, and therefore, does not allow for the provision of a totality of elementary
propositions. In order to be able to form a complete picture ofthe world, given an infinity of
elementary propositions, one must know which elementary propositions are true, and from this
one can determine that the rest of the infinity of other elementary propositions must be false.
If there is an infinity of elementary propositions for the reasons described above, then at best one
can be given a totality of classes of elementary propositions. The infinity of elementary
propositions is due to there being an infinite number of specific instances of a limited number of
types of relations which might pertain between specific sets of objects. If each type of relation is
presented by a variable for which there is an infinite number of relations that might replace that
variable, then there can be a totality of classes of elementary propositions. Given such a totality
of classes of elementary propositions, one might be able to form a complete picture of several
different possible worlds by choosing as true one instance of each class of elementary
proposition, automatically excluding all other instances of that class from being true. However,
in that there is an infinity of different instances to choose from for each class of elementary
proposition, one would never, in this way, be able to form a picture of all possible worlds. The
result of this is that it would not be possible to display logical necessity as that which is true in all
possible worlds, in the way that Wittgenstein had hoped.
While this reading of the Tractatus does not allow that it can be shown what is true in all possible
worlds, it does allow that a complete description of the world at any given point in time can
reveal what is true for that world. In this respect, the assessment of Wittgenstein's work has been
fruitful. It has uncovered that elementary propositions are incapable of independence because
they often represent a set of objects standing in a relation, which, when the elementary
proposition is true, excludes the possibility of truth for elementary propositions representing the
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same objects in an incompatible relation. The truly revealing notion, however, is that these
relations are incompatible because each corresponds to a different gradation on some scale.
This reading of the Tractatus has exposed the fact that logical space can be described in terms of
degree, a mode of description that Wittgenstein did not make use of in the work. However, it is
indicated that Wittgenstein felt there to be different modes of description, a thought which is
manifested in the proposition 6.342
6.342 And now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net might also
consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles and hexagons.) The
possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned above with a net of a given form
tells us nothing about the picture. (For that is true of all such pictures.) But what does
characterize the picture is that it can be described completely by a particular net with a
particular size of mesh. Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of
Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something
about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also
told something about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one
system of mechanics than with another.
This statement suggests that the world, like a picture, can be described completely in terms of
some specific descriptive mesh. Further, it is made known that the way in which the world is
described, in other words, by means of which particular mode of description the world is
described, indicates nothing about the world itself. However, the final sentence of 6.342 draws
attention to the fact that certain means of description are more effective than others. It is exactly
this conclusion which I feel that this thesis can come to. The world can be described more
precisely, and effectively for the purposes of the Tractatus, in terms of degree.
Summary
Part three of this thesis has shown that the implications of the requirement for the representation
of specific relations in a propositional sign are extensive for the Tractatus. Most notably, chapter
six made the case that the work does not present an account to explain how elementary
propositions, the bases of all propositions of language, can possibly represent specific relations.
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It was argued that all propositions are analyzable to elementary propositions, which are nothing
more than combinations of names. Further, it was argued that neither an account of relations as
being represented by spatial relations between names, nor an account of relations as objects
signified by names is sufficient to explain how specific relations can be represented in elementary
propositions. In this respect, it must be concluded that while the Tractatus places certain
demands on itself such that its propositions can remain informative though they are, by their own
standards, nonsensical, it is unable to adequately meet those demands.
The contention of chapter seven was that elementary propositions cannot, in meeting the demands
of the Tractatus, be independent of one another, thereby preventing the possibility that logical
necessity can be displayed. It was put forth that the infinity of specific relations which pertain
between objects in states of affairs, and which must be representable in elementary propositions
can exclude one another, thereby precluding elementary propositions from being independent. It
was then argued that in there being an infinity of distinguishable relations to be represented, there
is an infinity of non-independent elementary propositions which can describe the world. This in
turn rules out the prospect of being able to represent all possible worlds in a truth-table. The
consequence of this, it was shown, is that, in the way that Wittgenstein would have liked, given
his notion of independent elementary propositions, logical necessity cannot be displayed. It was
finally argued that, while the reading of the Tractatus given in this thesis does not allow for
logical necessity to be displayed, it does reveal that it is both possible and useful to describe the
world in terms of degree; a mode of description not used by Wittgenstein. Indeed, this reading of
the Tractatus indicates that the work demands that the world be described in terms of degree, so
that it is possible to account for specific and distinguishable relations.
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knowledge that the work is not able to support the claims that it's author would like it to. Second,
to show that certain subjects in the work are still open to fruitful investigations. Given the
magnitude of the Tractatus, this is a small task to have accomplished.
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